《可见的与不可见的》的原文摘录

  • 然而,哲学不是一个词,它对“语词的意义”不感兴趣,它不为我们所看见的世界找一个语词代用品,它不把世界转变成言说之物,它不置身于说出的或写出的范畴内,就像逻辑学家不置身于陈述中,诗人不置身于诗句中,音乐家不置身于音乐中那样。它要的是把事物本身,把事物沉默的本质引向表达。 (查看原文)
    Mr非想非非想 4赞 2018-09-15 16:05:50
    —— 引自第13页
  • My flesh and that of the world therefore involve clear zones, clearings, about which pivot their opaque zones, and the primary visibility, that of the quale and of the things, does not come without a second visibility, that of the lines of force and dimensions, the massive flesh without a rarefied flesh, the momentary body without a glorified body. (查看原文)
    九璃 1赞 2016-05-07 04:52:13
    —— 引自第148页
  • 古老争论假设了普遍的世界和自在的真,它降低我们知觉的地位(我们依靠且仅能依靠知觉来看这个世界),将它和我们的梦一起扔给我们的“内在生命”。 (查看原文)
    童末 1赞 2011-02-09 21:32:47
    —— 引自第18页
  • 但知觉/真正的视像和梦之间,有一种结构性差异、本质的差异:前者是一个协调一致的开放的探索系统;梦则是不可观察的,几乎是不能检验的。 (查看原文)
    童末 1赞 2011-02-09 21:32:47
    —— 引自第18页
  • 如果我们(像入梦一样)能在不知不觉中丧失我们的方位标,那么我们就永远不能肯定我们一定能在我们以为拥有这些方位标时果真拥有。如果我们能够在不知不觉中从世界中获得知觉,那么就没有任何东西证明我们总是在世界中,没有任何东西证明可观察的东西永远是用不同于梦的碎片织成。 (查看原文)
    童末 1赞 2011-02-09 21:32:47
    —— 引自第18页
  • 在自在存在与“内在生活”之间,怀疑论甚至看不到“世界的问题”,相反,我们则走向这个问题。我们感兴趣的不是人们将世界的存在看成“不确实”的理由,对我们来说,重要的正是知道世界存在的意义。 (查看原文)
    童末 1赞 2011-02-09 21:32:47
    —— 引自第18页
  • Le foi: nous ne saurions pas meme ce que c'est que le faux, si nous ne l'avions pas distingue quelquesfois du vrai (查看原文)
    谢雨山 2011-10-23 05:17:26
    —— 引自第19页
  • Certes, ceci ne termine pas le problème de notre accès au monde: il ne fait au contraire que commencer, car il reste a savoir comment nous pouvons avoir l'illusion de voir ce que nous ne voyons pas, comment les haillons du rêve peuvent, devant le rêveur, valoir pour le tissu serré du monde vrai, comment l'inconscience de n'avoir pas observé, peut, dans l'homme fasciné, tenir lieu de la conscience d'avoir observé. (查看原文)
    谢雨山 1赞 2011-10-23 05:46:19
    —— 引自第20页
  • The transcendental field is a field of transcendencies. The transcendental, being a resolute overcoming of the mens sive anima [a fragment of the world] and the psychological, goes beyond the subjectivity in the sense of counter-transcendence and immanence. The passage to intersubjectivity is contradictory only with regard to an insufficient reduction, Husserl was right to say. But a sufficient reduction leads beyond the alleged transcendental "immanence," it leads to the absolute spirit understood as Weltlichkeit, to Geist as Ineinander of the spontaneities, itself founded on the aesthesiological Ineinander and on the sphere of life as sphere of Einfühlung and intercorporeity ... ... the introduction of the other is not what produces the "objective transcendence": the other is one of its... (查看原文)
    豆友58906132 2016-11-29 22:12:02
    —— 引自第172页
  • Meaning is invisible, but the invisible is not the contradictory of the visible: the visible itself has an invisible inner framework (membrure), and the in-visible is the secret counterpart of the visible, it appears only within it, it is the Nichturpräsentierbar which is presented to me as such within the world - one cannot see it there and every effort to see it there makes it disappear, but it is in the line of the visible, it is its virtual focus, it is inscribed within it (in filigree) - (查看原文)
    豆友58906132 2016-11-29 22:27:11
    —— 引自第215页
  • It is the things themselves, from the depths of their silence, that it wishes to bring to expression. If the philosopher questions, and hence feigns ignorance of the world and of the vision of the world which are operative and take form continually within him, he does so precisely in order to make them speak, because he believes in them and expects from them all his future science. (查看原文)
    豆友58906132 2017-11-02 01:24:36
    —— 引自章节:Chapter 1.1
  • Then, the difference between perception and dream not being absolute, one is justified in counting them both among “our experiences,” and it is above perception itself that we must seek the guarantee and the sense of its ontological function. We will stake out that route, which is that of the philosophy of reflection (la philosophie réflexive), when it opens. (查看原文)
    豆友58906132 2017-11-02 01:24:36
    —— 引自章节:Chapter 1.1
  • What interests us is not the reasons one can have to consider the existence of the world “uncertain”— as if one already knew what to exist is and as if the whole question were to apply this concept appropriately. For us the essential is to know precisely what the being of the world means. Here we must presuppose nothing— neither the naïve idea of being in itself, therefore, nor the correlative idea of a being of representation, of a being for the consciousness, of a being for man: these, along with the being of the world, are all notions that we have to rethink with regard to our experience of the world. (查看原文)
    豆友58906132 2017-11-02 01:24:36
    —— 引自章节:Chapter 1.1
  • ... my vision of the world itself were formed from a certain point of the world. (查看原文)
    豆友58906132 2017-11-02 01:24:36
    —— 引自章节:Chapter 1.1
  • We can effect the passage by looking, by awakening to the world; we cannot witness it as spectators. It is not a synthesis; it is a metamorphosis by which the appearances are instantaneously stripped of a value they owed merely to the absence of a true perception. (查看原文)
    豆友58906132 2017-11-02 01:24:36
    —— 引自章节:Chapter 1.1
  • The world is what I perceive, but as soon as we examine and express its absolute proximity, it also becomes, inexplicably, irremediable distance. The ‘‘natural’* man holds on to both ends of the chain, thinks at the same time that his perception enters into the things and that it is formed this side of his body. Yet coexist as the two convictions do without difficulty in the exercise of life, once reduced to theses and to propositions they destroy one another and leave us in confusion. (查看原文)
    豆友58906132 2017-11-02 01:24:36
    —— 引自章节:Chapter 1.1
  • ... the moment perception comes my body effaces itself before it and never does the perception grasp the body in the act of perceiving. * If my left hand is touching my right hand, and if I should suddenly wish to apprehend with my right hand the work of my left hand as it touches, this reflection of the body upon itself always miscarries at the last moment: the moment I feel my left hand with my right hand, I correspondingly cease touching my right hand with my left hand. (查看原文)
    豆友58906132 2017-11-02 01:24:36
    —— 引自章节:Chapter 1.1
  • ... it is, as it were, prepared for a self-perception, even though it is never itself that is perceived nor itself that perceives. (查看原文)
    豆友58906132 2017-11-02 01:24:36
    —— 引自章节:Chapter 1.1
  • The intervention of the other does not resolve the internal paradox of my perception: it adds to it this other enigma: of the propagation of my own most secret life in another— another enigma, but yet the same one, since, from all the evidence, it is only through the world that I can leave myself. (查看原文)
    豆友58906132 2017-11-02 01:24:36
    —— 引自章节:Chapter 1.1
  • That a child perceives before he thinks, that he begins by putting his dreams in the things, his thoughts in the others, forming with them, as it were, one block of common life wherein the perspectives of each are not yet distinguished— these genetic facts cannot be simply ignored by philosophy in the name of the exigencies of the intrinsic analysis. Thought cannot ignore its apparent history ... it must put to itself the problem of the genesis of its own meaning. (查看原文)
    豆友58906132 2017-11-02 01:24:36
    —— 引自章节:Chapter 1.1
<前页 1 2 后页>