Merleau-Ponty and Nancy on Sense and Being

Marie-Eve Morin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Canada. She is the author of many articles on Derrida, Heidegger, Nancy, Sartre, Latour, and Sloterdijk. She is also the author of Jean-Luc Nancy (Polity, 2012) and is the co-editor, with Peter Gratton, of The Nancy Dictionary (Edinburgh University Press, 2015) and Jean-Luc Nancy and Plural Thi...

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Marie-Eve Morin is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Canada. She is the author of many articles on Derrida, Heidegger, Nancy, Sartre, Latour, and Sloterdijk. She is also the author of Jean-Luc Nancy (Polity, 2012) and is the co-editor, with Peter Gratton, of The Nancy Dictionary (Edinburgh University Press, 2015) and Jean-Luc Nancy and Plural Thinking: Expositions of World, Politics, Art, and Sense (SUNY, 2012). She is editor of Continental Realism and its Discontents (Edinburgh University Press, 2017).

Introduction
i. The Context: The Speculative Realist Challenge
ii. The Limits of Phenomenology: Being and Sense
iii. Merleau-Ponty and Nancy: Influence and Resonances
iv. Breakdown
Part I – Body
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Introduction
i. The Context: The Speculative Realist Challenge
ii. The Limits of Phenomenology: Being and Sense
iii. Merleau-Ponty and Nancy: Influence and Resonances
iv. Breakdown
Part I – Body
1. Merleau-Ponty, Descartes and the Unreflected Life of the Body
i. Reading Descartes: The Relation Between Reflection and the Unreflected
ii. Sensing and Self-Sensing Body of the Phenomenology of Perception
iii. The Problem of the Phenomenology of Perception: Tacit Versus Operative Cogito
2. Nancy, Descartes, the Exposition of Bodies and the Extension of the Soul
i. Nancy’s Reading of Descartes: The Unum Quid Against the Modern Subject
ii. Nancy’s Bodies: Skin, Sense, Touch
3. Divergences: Unity Versus Dislocation
i. Synthesis of the Body Schema or Partes extra Partes?
ii. Synaesthesia or Dislocation of the Senses? Self-Touching or Touching the Outside?
Part II – Thing
4. Things in the Phenomenology of Perception: The Paradox of an In-Itself-for-Us
i. The Order of the Phenomena: Between Being and Appearance
ii. Answering the Accusation of Correlationism
iii. The Limit of the Answer in the Phenomenology and the Move to Ontology
5. Things After the Phenomenology: Merleau-Ponty’s Cautious Anthropomorphism
i. Sartre’s Things
ii. Merleau-Ponty’s Things
iii. Anthropomorphism as Defamiliarization
6. Nancy’s Materialism and the Stone
i. The Freedom of the Stone and the Creation of the World
ii. The Existence of the Stone and Its Feeling Hard
iii. Materialism, Materiality, Matter
iv. Thinking and Things
Part III – Being
7. Merleau-Ponty’s and Nancy’s Engagement with Heidegger
i. Is Merleau-Ponty’s Late Ontology Heideggerian?
ii. Merleau-Ponty Between Husserl’s Wesenschau and Heidegger’s Wesen
iii. Merleau-Ponty Between the Negativism of Doubt and the Positivism of Essences
iv. Merleau-Ponty’s Indirect Ontology
v. Nancy and Heidegger’s Withdrawal of Being
8. Two Ontologies of Sense
i. Merleau-Ponty, Écart, and the Flesh
ii. Narcissism and the Reversibility of the Chiasm
iii. Écart as Encroachment or Separation
iv. Conclusion: Two Ontologies of Sense for Our Time
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