The Shorter Logical Investigations (International Library of Philosophy)

Edmund Husserl is widely regarded as one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. The founder of phenomenology, the Logical Investigations is his most famous work. Published in two volumes in 1900, it had a decisive impact on the direction of twentieth century philosophy. It is one of the few works to have influenced philosophers as far apart as Frege a...

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Edmund Husserl is widely regarded as one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. The founder of phenomenology, the Logical Investigations is his most famous work. Published in two volumes in 1900, it had a decisive impact on the direction of twentieth century philosophy. It is one of the few works to have influenced philosophers as far apart as Frege and Heidegger and had a crucial impact on the development of both continental and analytic philosophy. This paperback abridged edition of J.N.Findlay's translation makes the key sections of this classic work available in one volume for the first time. It has been specially edited and includes a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing the Logical Investigations in historical context and bringing out its importance for contemporary philosophy. This shorter version also includes a new preface by Sir Michael Dummett.

Preface by Michael Dummett xxi
Introduction by Dermot Moran xxv
Select bibliography lxxix
Translator’s Introduction (Abridged) lxxxiii
Foreword to First German Edition, Volume I (1900) 1
Foreword to Second German Edition, Volume I (1913) 3
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Preface by Michael Dummett xxi
Introduction by Dermot Moran xxv
Select bibliography lxxix
Translator’s Introduction (Abridged) lxxxiii
Foreword to First German Edition, Volume I (1900) 1
Foreword to Second German Edition, Volume I (1913) 3
PROLEGOMENA TO PURE LOGIC
Volume I of the German Editions 9
INTRODUCTION 11
§1 The controversy regarding the definition of logic and the essential content of its doctrines 11
§2 Necessity of a renewed discussion of questions of principle 12
§3 Disputed questions. The path to be entered 13
CHAPTER ONE
Logic as a normative and, in particular, as a practical discipline 15
§4 The theoretical incompleteness of the separate sciences 15
§5 The theoretical completion of the separate sciences by metaphysics and theory of science 16
§6 The possibility and justification of logic as theory of science 16
§10 The ideas of theory and science as problems of the theory of science 19
§11 Logic or theory of science as normative discipline and as technology 20
§12 Relevant definitions of logic 21
CHAPTER TWO
Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines 23
§14 The concept of a normative science. The basic standard or principle that gives it unity 23
§15 Normative disciplines and technologies 27
§16 Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines 27
CHAPTER THREE
Psychologism, its arguments and its attitude to the usual counter-arguments 30
§17 The disputed question as to whether the essential theoretical foundations of normative logic lie in psychology 30
§18 The line of proof of the psychologistic thinkers 31
§19 The usual arguments of the opposition and the psychologistic rejoinder 31
§20 A gap in the psychologistic line of proof 34
CHAPTER FOUR
Empiricistic consequences of psychologism 36
§22 The laws of thought as supposed laws of nature which operate in isolation as causes of rational thought 36
§23 A third consequence of psychologism, and its refutation 38
§24 Continuation 41
CHAPTER SEVEN
Psychologism as a sceptical relativism 44
§32 The ideal conditions for the possibility of a theory as such. The strict concept of scepticism 44
§33 Scepticism in the metaphysical sense 45
§34 The concept of relativism and its specific forms 46
§35 Critique of individual relativism 47
§36 Critique of specific relativism and, in particular, of anthropologism 47
§37 General observation. The concept of relativism in an extended sense 51
§38 Psychologism in all its forms is a relativism 51
CHAPTER EIGHT
The psychologistic prejudices 53
§41 First prejudice 53
§44 Second prejudice 55
§45 Refutation. Pure mathematics would likewise be made a branch of psychology 56
§46 The research domain of pure logic is, like that of mathematics, an ideal domain 57
§49 Third prejudice. Logic as the theory of evidence 59
§50 Transformation of logical propositions into equivalent propositions about the ideal conditions for evidence of judgement. The resultant propositions are not psychological 60
§51 The decisive points in this dispute 63
CHAPTER TEN
End of our critical treatments 67
§61 Need for special investigations to provide an epistemological justification and partial realization of the Idea of pure logic 67
Appendix: References to F. A. Lange and B. Bolzano 68
CHAPTER ELEVEN
The idea of pure logic 71
§62 The unity of science. The interconnection of things and the interconnection of truths 71
§63 Continuation. The unity of theory 73
§65 The question as to the ideal conditions of the possibility of science or of theory in general. A. The question as it relates to actual knowledge 74
§66 B. The question as it relates to the content of knowledge 76
§67 The tasks of pure logic. First: the fixing of the pure categories of meaning, the pure categories of objects and their law-governed combinations 78
§68 Secondly: the laws and theories which have their grounds in these categories 79
§69 Thirdly: the theory of the possible forms of theories or the pure theory of manifolds 80
INVESTIGATIONS INTO PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
Volume II, Part 1 of the German Editions 85
INTRODUCTION 85
§1 The necessity of phenomenological investigations as a preliminary to the epistemological criticism and clarification of pure logic 85
§2 Elucidation of the aims of such investigations 86
§3 The difficulties of pure phenomenological analysis 90
§4 It is essential to keep in mind the grammatical side of our logical experiences 92
§5 Statement of the main aims of the following analytical investigations 93
§6 Additional Notes 94
§7 ‘Freedom from presuppositions’ as a principle in epistemological investigations 97
INVESTIGATION I
EXPRESSION AND MEANING 101
CHAPTER ONE
Essential distinctions 103
§1 An ambiguity in the term ‘sign’ 103
§2 The essence of indication 103
§5 Expressions as meaningful signs. Setting aside of a sense of ‘expression’ not relevant for our purpose 104
§6 Questions as to the phenomenological and intentional distinctions which pertain to expressions as such 105
§7 Expressions as they function in communication 106
§8 Expressions in solitary life 107
§9 Phenomenological distinctions between the physical appearance of the expression, and the sense-giving and sense-fulfilling act 108
§10 The phenomenological unity of these acts 110
§11 The ideal distinctions: firstly, between expression and meaning as ideal entities 112
§12 Continuation: the expressed objectivity 114
§13 Connection between meaning and objective reference 115
§14 Content as object, content as fulfilling sense and content as sense or meaning simpliciter 116
§15 The equivocations in talk of meaning and meaninglessness connected with these distinctions 117
CHAPTER THREE
Fluctuation in meaning and the ideality of unities of meaning 121
§24 Introduction 121
§25 Relations of coincidence among the contents of intimation and naming 121
§26 Essentially occasional and objective expressions 122
§29 Pure logic and ideal meanings 126
INVESTIGATION II
THE IDEAL UNITY OF THE SPECIES AND MODERN THEORIES OF ABSTRACTION 131
Introduction 133
CHAPTER ONE
Universal objects and the consciousness of universality 135
§1 We are conscious of universal objects in acts which differ essentially from those in which we are conscious of individual objects 135
§2 The indispensability of talk about universal objects 136
§3 Must the unity of the Species be regarded as a spurious unity? Identity and exact likeness 137
§4 Objections to the reduction of ideal unity to dispersed multiplicity 138
§6 Transition to the following chapters 140
CHAPTER TWO
The psychological hypostatization of the universal 142
§7 The metaphysical and psychological hypostatization of the universal. Nominalism 142
§8 A deceptive line of thought 143
CHAPTER THREE
Abstraction and attention 145
§14 Objections to any and every form of nominalism. (a) The lack of a descriptive fixation of aims 145
§15 (b) The origin of modern nominalism as an exaggerated reaction to Locke’s doctrine of general ideas. The essential character of this nominalism, and of the theory of abstraction in terms of attention 147
§16 (c) Generality of psychological function and generality as a meaning-form. Different senses of the relation of a universal to an extension 149
§17 (d) Application to the critique of nominalism 151
§21 The difference between attending to a non-independent moment of an intuited object and attending to the corresponding attribute in specie 151
§22 Fundamental deficiencies in the phenomenological analysis of attention 153
§23 Significant talk of attention embraces the whole sphere of thinking and not merely the sphere of intuition 155
CHAPTER FOUR
Abstraction and representation 158
§24 The general idea as a device for economizing thought 158
INVESTIGATION III
ON THE THEORY OF WHOLES AND PARTS 161
Introduction 163
CHAPTER ONE
The difference between independent and non-independent objects 164
§1 Complex and simple, articulated and unarticulated objects 164
§2 Introduction of the distinction between independent and non-independent objects (contents) 165
§3 The inseparability of non-independent contents 166
§4 Analyses of examples following Stumpf 167
§10 The multiplicity of laws governing the various sorts of non-independent contents 169
§11 The difference between these ‘material’ laws and ‘formal’ or ‘analytic’ laws 170
§12 Basic determinations in regard to analytic and synthetic propositions 172
CHAPTER TWO
Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts 174
§14 The concept of Foundation and some relevant theorems 174
§21 Exact pinning down of the pregnant notions of Whole and Part, and of their essential Species, by means of the notion of Foundation 176
§23 Forms of categorial unity and wholes 177
§24 The pure formal types of wholes and parts. The postulate of an a priori theory 178
INVESTIGATION IV
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT AND NON-INDEPENDENT MEANINGS AND THE IDEA OF PURE GRAMMAR 181
Introduction 183
§1 Simple and complex meanings 184
§4 The question of the meaningfulness of ‘syncategorematic’ components of complex expressions 184
§5 Independent and non-independent meanings. The non-independence of the sensory and expressive parts of words 186
§7 The conception of non-independent meanings as founded contents 187
§8 Difficulties of this conception. (a) Whether the non-independence of the meaning does not really only lie in the non-independence of the object meant 189
§10 A priori laws governing combinations of meanings 189
§12 Nonsense and absurdity 192
§13 The laws of the compounding of meanings and the pure logico-grammatical theory of forms 193
INVESTIGATION V
ON INTENTIONAL EXPERIENCES AND THEIR ‘CONTENTS’ 197
Introduction 199
CHAPTER ONE
Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego and consciousness as inner perception 201
§1 Varied ambiguity of the term ‘consciousness’ 201
§2 First sense: Consciousness as the real phenomenological unity of the ego’s experiences. The concept of an experience 202
§4 The relation between experiencing consciousness and experienced content is no phenomenologically peculiar type of relation 204
§5 Second sense. ‘Inner’ consciousness as inner perception 205
§6 Origin of the first concept of consciousness out of the second 206
§8 The pure ego and awareness (‘Bewusstheit’) 208
Additional Note to the Second Edition 210
CHAPTER TWO
Consciousness as intentional experience 211
§9 The meaning of Brentano’s demarcation of ‘psychic phenomena’ 211
§10 Descriptive characterization of acts as ‘intentional’ experiences 212
§11 Avoidance of verbally tempting misunderstandings. (a) The ‘mental’ or ‘immanent’ object 214
§12 (b) The act and the relation of consciousness or the ego to the object 217
§13 The fixing of our terminology 218
§14 Difficulties which surround the assumption of acts as a descriptively founded class of experiences 219
§15 Whether experiences of one and the same phenomenological kind (of the genus Feeling in particular) can consist partly of acts and partly of non-acts 223
(a) Are there any intentional feelings? 224
(b) Are there non-intentional feelings? Distinction between feeling-sensations and feeling-acts 226
§16 Distinction between descriptive and intentional content 229
§17 The intentional content in the sense of the intentional object 230
§18 Simple and complex, founding and founded acts 232
§20 The difference between the quality and the matter of an act 233
§21 The intentional and the semantic essence 236
Appendix to §11 and §20. Critique of the ‘image-theory’ and of the doctrine of the ‘immanent’ objects of acts 238
CHAPTER THREE
The matter of the act and its underlying presentation 242
§22 The question of the relation between the matter and quality of an act 242
§23 The view of ‘matter’ as a founding act of ‘mere presentation’ 243
§27 The testimony of direct intuition. Perceptual presentation and perception 245
CHAPTER FOUR
Study of founding presentations with special regard to the theory of judgement 249
§32 An ambiguity in the word ‘presentation’, and the supposed self-evidence of the principle that every act is founded on an act of presentation 249
CHAPTER FIVE
Further contributions to the theory of judgement. ‘Presentation’ as a qualitatively unitary genus of nominal and propositional acts 251
§37 The aim of the following investigation. The concept of an objectifying act 251
§38 Qualitative and material differentiation of objectifying acts 252
§39 Presentation in the sense of an objectifying act, and its qualitative modification 255
§40 Continuation. Qualitative and imaginative modification 258
§41 New interpretation of the principle that makes presentations the basis of all acts. The objectifying act as the primary bearer of ‘matter’ 260
CHAPTER SIX
Summing-up of the most important ambiguities in the terms ‘presentation’ and ‘content’ 261
§44 ‘Presentation’ 261
§45 The ‘presentational content’ 265
Note 265
Volume II, Part 2 of the Second German Edition 267
Foreword to the Second Edition (1921) 267
INVESTIGATION VI
ELEMENTS OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ELUCIDATION OF KNOWLEDGE 271
Introduction 273
First Section
Objectifying intentions and their fulfilments: knowledge as a synthesis of fulfilment and its gradations 279
CHAPTER ONE
Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment 281
§1 Whether every type of mental act, or only certain types, can function as carriers of meaning 281
§2 That all acts may be expressed does not decide the issue. There are two senses to talk about expressing an act 282
§3 A third sense of talk about the ‘expression’ of acts. Formulation of our theme 283
§4 The expression of a percept (‘judgement of perception’). Its meaning cannot lie in perception, but must lie in peculiar expressive acts 285
§5 Continuation. Perception as an act which determines meaning, without embodying it 286
Addendum 289
§6 The static unity of expressive thought and expressed intuition. Recognition (das Erkennen) 291
§7 Recognition as a character of acts, and the ‘generality of words’ 292
§8 The dynamic unity of expression and expressed intuition. The consciousness of fulfilment and that of identity 296
Addendum 298
§10 The wider class of experiences of fulfilment. Intuitions as intentions which require fulfilment 299
§11 Frustration and conflict. The synthesis of distinction 300
CHAPTER TWO
Indirect characterization of objectifying intentions and their essential varieties through differences in the syntheses of fulfilment 302
§13 The synthesis of knowing (recognition) as the characteristic form of fulfilment for objectifying acts. Subsumption of acts of meaning under the class of objectifying acts 302
§14 Phenomenological characterization of the distinction between signitive and intuitive intentions through peculiarities of fulfilment. (a) Sign, image and self-presentation 304
(b) The perceptual and imaginative adumbration of the object 306
§15 Signitive intentions beyond the limits of the meaning-function 308
CHAPTER THREE
The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge 312
§16 Simple identification and fulfilment 312
§17 The question of the relation between fulfilment and intuitive illustration 314
§22 Fullness and ‘intuitive substance’ (Gehalt) 315
§23 Relationships of weight between the intuitive and signitive ‘substance’ (Gehalt) of one and the same act. Pure intuition and pure signification. Perceptual and imaginal content, pure perception and pure imagination. Gradations of fulness 316
§25 Fullness and intentional matter 319
§26 Continuation. Representation or interpretation (Auffassung). Matter as the interpretative sense, the interpretative form and the interpreted content. Differentiating characterization of intuitive and signitive interpretation 322
§29 Complete and defective intuitions. Adequate and objectively complete intuitive illustrations. Essentia (Essenz) 324
CHAPTER FIVE
The ideal of adequation. Self-evidence and truth 327
§36 Introduction 327
§37 The fulfilling function of perception. The ideal of ultimate fulfilment 327
§38 Positing acts in the function of fulfilment. Self-evidence in the loose and strict sense 330
§39 Self-evidence and truth 331
Second Section
Sense and understanding 337
CHAPTER SIX
Sensuous and categorial intuitions 339
§40 The problem of the fulfilment of categorial meaning-forms, with a thought leading towards its solution 339
§41 Continuation. Extension of our sphere of examples 342
§42 The distinction between sensuous stuff and categorial form throughout the whole realm of objectifying acts 343
§43 The objective correlates of categorial forms are not ‘real’ (realen) moments 345
§44 The origin of the concept of Being and of the remaining categories does not lie in the realm of inner perception 346
§45 Widening of the concept of Intuition, and in particular of the concepts Perception and Imagination. Sensible and categorial intuition 348
§46 Phenomenological analysis of the distinction between sensuous and categorial perception 349
§47 Continuation. Characterization of sense-perception as ‘straightforward’ perception 351
§48 Characterization of categorial acts as founded acts 354
§52 Universal objects constituting themselves in universal intuitions 357
CHAPTER SEVEN
A study in categorial representation 360
§53 Backward reference to the researches of our first section 360
CHAPTER EIGHT
The a priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking 362
§59 The complication into ever new forms. The pure theory of the forms of possible intuitions 362
§60 The relative or functional difference between matter and form. Pure acts of understanding, and those mixed with sense. Sensuous concepts and categories 363
§61 Categorial forming involves no real reshaping of the object 364
§62 Our freedom in the categorial forming of given material and its limits. Purely categorial laws (laws of ‘authentic’ thinking) 365
§63 The new laws of the validity of signitive and admixedly signitive acts (laws of inauthentic thinking) 368
§64 The pure logico-grammatical laws are laws for any understanding whatever, and not merely for any human understanding. Their psychological meaning and normative function in relation to inadequate thought 371
§65 The senseless problem of the real meaning of the logical 373
§66 Distinction between the most important differences mixed up in the current opposition of ‘intuiting’ and ‘thinking’ 374
Additional note to the Second Edition 376
Third Section
Clarification of our introductory problem 377
CHAPTER NINE
Non-objectifying acts as apparent fulfilments of meaning 379
§67 That not every act of meaning includes an act of knowing 379
§68 The controversy regarding the interpretation of the peculiar grammatical forms which express non-objectifying acts 381
§69 Arguments for and against the Aristotelian conception 383
§70 Decision 388
APPENDIX
External and internal perception: physical and psychical phenomena 391
§1 The popular and the traditional philosophical concepts of external and internal perception 391
§2 and 3 Epistemological and psychological motives for deepening the traditional division: Brentano’s conception 392
§4 Criticism. External and internal perception are, on a normal interpretation of the concepts, of the same epistemological character: Perception and Apperception 396
§5 The equivocations of the term ‘appearance’ 397
§5a Excised passage from the First Edition 400
§6 There is for this reason confusion between the epistemologically meaningless opposition of inner and outer perception, and the epistemologically fundamental opposition of adequate and inadequate perception 400
§7 That the dispute is not verbal 402
§8 Confusion of two fundamentally different divisions of ‘phenomena’. That ‘physical’ contents do not exist ‘in merely phenomenal fashion’, but exist ‘actually’ 403
Notes 405
Index 417
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