《Husserl and the Promise of Time》的原文摘录

  • Retentional consciousness is a transcendence of "de-presentification" (Entgegenwärtigung) in the sense of counter-intentionality. [21] In this, its primary significance, retention is not a “holding back,” as if I were holding back something running away from me, but a withholding or not making present. Retentional intentionality runs counter to the givenness of an original impression. Whereas an original impression is the wellspring of the visibility and affective force of lived experience, retentional consciousness “de-presentifies” in the sense of “emptying,” or reversing, the intuitive fullness of the now. [21] Entgegenwärtigung is a terminological innovation from Husserl's later writings in the C-manuscripts to describe the emptying function of original time-consciousness, and speci... (查看原文)
    2016-09-25 00:59:47
    —— 引自章节:The Retention of Time Past (Ch
  • Importantly, retentional modification does not “negate” or “infect” an original impression with a difference, or differentiation, of alterity “from the outside,” so to speak, since an original impression necessarily succumbs to, or becomes, its own retentional modification ... ; indeed, as Husserl routinely emphasizes, an original impression is itself an abstraction, as it always irrupts in an interplay of retentional consciousness. The now is no longer than the retention of what it no longer is. (查看原文)
    2016-09-25 00:59:47
    —— 引自章节:The Retention of Time Past (Ch
  • In retentional modification, an original impression is thrown “outside of itself.” Time-consciousness is, in other words, “ecstatic.” Expressed in Husserl’s native conceptuality: timeconsciousness is transcendence within immanence. (查看原文)
    2016-09-25 00:59:47
    —— 引自章节:The Retention of Time Past (Ch
  • In its necessary retentional modification, an original impression is defined by the law of its modification of presence; but by the same logic, the absence of presence inscribed in the essence of the now allows for a renewal of its presence. The entwinement of original impression and retentional modification reflects the entwinement of absence and presence, running-off and renewal, at the origin of time-consciousness. (查看原文)
    2016-09-25 00:59:47
    —— 引自章节:The Retention of Time Past (Ch
  • ... the consciousness of the now is both one and two, a consciousness of an in-betweenness that is itself caught in-between, and thus, situated, within the intersection of the absence and presence of time-consciousness itself. Time-consciousness is an original dispersal; the origin is always a diaspora, the loss of a renewed presence, an invitation for the retrieval of an origin already past in the opening of a new beginning. (查看原文)
    2016-09-25 00:59:47
    —— 引自章节:The Retention of Time Past (Ch
  • Indeed, this was precisely the problem that faced Husserl’s attempt to describe the temporality of perceptual acts of consciousness through the schema of apprehension/content of apprehension. Armed with the double intentionality of retentional consciousness and its unique form of self-transcendence, Husserl is now in a position to recognize that “the phases of consciousness and continuities of consciousness must not be regarded as time-objects themselves” (Hua X, 333 [345]). The flow (or stream) of original time-consciousness along the lengthwise continuum of self-retention does not have the form of a duration or succession; the manner in which consciousness retains, and re-retains, itself, relative to the renewal of an original impression is not comparable to a rectilinear movement or f... (查看原文)
    2016-09-25 00:59:47
    —— 引自章节:The Retention of Time Past (Ch
  • The double intentionality of retentional consciousness is an essentially constitutive accomplishment, in constituting both, but each in a different manner, the temporal givenness of a time-object as well as the temporality of perceptual consciousness. Indeed, retentional consciousness, as a continuous of self-differentiation or flow, constitutes itself as this difference itself. (查看原文)
    2016-09-25 00:59:47
    —— 引自章节:The Retention of Time Past (Ch
  • The characterization of time-constituting consciousness as flowing or streaming underlines the “lived” and “concrete” weave of original time-consciousness as a condition of possibility. Original time-consciousness, in its three-fold temporal declension, is NOT an act of consciousness, but its inner CONDITION OF POSSIBILITY, or “operative intentionality” on the basis of which the “thematic intentionality” described in the Ideen (noetic–noematic correlation) is grounded. (查看原文)
    2016-09-25 00:59:47
    —— 引自章节:The Retention of Time Past (Ch
  • As built of SEDIMENTATIONS ... experiences of the past are compacted into a depth or reservoir of meaning that can be recollected in the present as well as provide, in the form of what Husserl will identify as “FAR RETENTIONS,” a horizon of possibilities and implicit meaning through which I already navigate the world yet to come. Husserl’s seminal insight into the double intentionality of original time-consciousness frames his later investigations of the retrieval and reactivation of the origin of constitutional accomplishments, as, for example, in “The Origin of Geometry.” (查看原文)
    2016-09-25 00:59:47
    —— 引自章节:The Retention of Time Past (Ch
  • The “transcendental absolute” that the Ideen prepared, but did not reach, is finally uncovered. Absolute time-consciousness retains itself – in both senses: it retains itself and is itself retaining. In this self-temporalization, absolute time-consciousness differentiates itself in a two-fold manner along the lines of the double intentionality of retentional consciousness: as a differentiation from itself in terms of the transcendence of constituted time-objects (“cross-intentionality”) visa`- vis constituting immanent consciousness (“length-intentionality”); as a differentiation of itself in terms of the transcendence of absolute time-constituting consciousness vis-a`-vis constituted immanent consciousness. ... absolute time-consciousness, as an impossible puzzle, hides itself within i... (查看原文)
    2016-09-25 00:59:47
    —— 引自章节:The Retention of Time Past (Ch
  • The constitution of the Other within my primordial sphere is the converse of the impossible puzzle of my own self-constitution - and this is the sense in which we can understand Husserl's metaphor of mirroring in his analysis of empathy, especially in ... (Hua XIV and XV). The formal comparison turns on the sense in which I escape myself as constituting, and the Other, as herself a constituting subjectivity, eludes, and cannot be made present within, my primordial sphere even though the other is "co-constituted" by me. The intersection of intentionalities in the constitution of empathy (the structure of double intentionality) mirrors the double intentionality of retentional consciousness and my own self-differentiation; the opacity of my own consciousness for itself, as the condition of ... (查看原文)
    2016-11-04 00:47:54
    —— 引自章节:The Life of Consciousness (Ch.
  • Husserl thus distinguishes two forms of passivity: the passivity of receptivity and an underlying passivity on the basis of which receptivity is itself possible. In this more original sense, passivity is not to be confused with receptivity, by which Husserl means Kantian receptivity. In Husserl's formulation, receptivity is characterized by the function of "rendering patent" (patent machen) and, in this regard, designates the way in which content of experience is already given, or pre-given, within the scope of the ego's attentiveness. ... this prior form is a passivity that "renders latent" (latent machen). To "render latent" is to open the ground not simply for the possibility of being made patent, but to open the ground of possibility itself. Original passivity would thus account for ... (查看原文)
    2017-01-06 23:32:08
    —— 引自第283页
  • In its explicit manifestation, the intersection between time-consciousness and the Other reveals an underlying affinity between how the Other, as irreducible to my self-presence, can nonetheless be given, and how the pas, as irreducible to my self-presence, can nonetheless be given. In both instances, the challenge is to understand the givenness of absence without undermining the phenomenological adherence to the original givenness of presence, or evidence, as the foundation for all constitution. ... Does the transcendence of the Other ultimately rest on the transcendence of absolute time-consciousness or does the temporalization of absolute time-consciousness rest on the alterity of the Other? (查看原文)
    2017-02-22 00:35:02
    —— 引自章节:The Lives of Others