Virtues of the Mind

Almost all theories of knowledge and justified belief employ moral concepts and forms of argument borrowed from moral theories, but none of them pay attention to the current renaissance in virtue ethics. This remarkable book is the first attempt to establish a theory of knowledge based on the model of virtue theory in ethics. The book develops the concept of an intellectual vir...

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Almost all theories of knowledge and justified belief employ moral concepts and forms of argument borrowed from moral theories, but none of them pay attention to the current renaissance in virtue ethics. This remarkable book is the first attempt to establish a theory of knowledge based on the model of virtue theory in ethics. The book develops the concept of an intellectual virtue, and then shows how the concept can be used to give an account of the major concepts in epistemology, including the concept of knowledge. This highly original work of philosophy for professionals will also provide students with an excellent introduction to epistemology, virtue theory, and the relationship between ethics and epistemology.

琳达·特林考斯·扎格泽博斯基是当今美国知名哲学家，2022年当选美国艺术与科学院院士，长期从事知识论、宗教哲学和德性理论等领域的研究，是德性知识论的重要代表人物之一。其学术成就集中体现在她对德性、知识与信仰关系的深刻重构上，形成了一个严密的思想体系。她于1991年的《自由与预知的两难》中深入探讨了神圣预知与人类自由的经典悖论，随后在1996年的成名作《心灵的德性：德性本质和知识伦理基础探究》中利用亚里士多德的德性思想创造性地重新阐释了理智德性的本质，并用于对知识本质的分析。此后，她一直笔耕不辍，在《神圣动机论》（2004）、《宗教哲学》（2007）、《认识的价值与我们所在意的东西》（2009）、《认知权威》（2012）、《范例主义的道德理论》（2017）和《第三次观念飞跃：世界冲突的根源与解决之道》（2021）等一系列著作中，不仅展现了宏大的哲学史视...

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琳达·特林考斯·扎格泽博斯基是当今美国知名哲学家，2022年当选美国艺术与科学院院士，长期从事知识论、宗教哲学和德性理论等领域的研究，是德性知识论的重要代表人物之一。其学术成就集中体现在她对德性、知识与信仰关系的深刻重构上，形成了一个严密的思想体系。她于1991年的《自由与预知的两难》中深入探讨了神圣预知与人类自由的经典悖论，随后在1996年的成名作《心灵的德性：德性本质和知识伦理基础探究》中利用亚里士多德的德性思想创造性地重新阐释了理智德性的本质，并用于对知识本质的分析。此后，她一直笔耕不辍，在《神圣动机论》（2004）、《宗教哲学》（2007）、《认识的价值与我们所在意的东西》（2009）、《认知权威》（2012）、《范例主义的道德理论》（2017）和《第三次观念飞跃：世界冲突的根源与解决之道》（2021）等一系列著作中，不仅展现了宏大的哲学史视野，更彰显了不畏艰难的理智勇气。

Part I – The methodology of epistemology
Using moral theory in epistemology – p. 3
1.1 Contemporary epistemic theories and their ethical models – p. 6
1.2 Some advantages of virtue-based theories – p. 15
Difficulties in contemporary epistemology – p. 29
2.1 Problems in the notion of justification – p. 29
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Part I – The methodology of epistemology
Using moral theory in epistemology – p. 3
1.1 Contemporary epistemic theories and their ethical models – p. 6
1.2 Some advantages of virtue-based theories – p. 15
Difficulties in contemporary epistemology – p. 29
2.1 Problems in the notion of justification – p. 29
2.2 The neglect of understanding and wisdom – p. 43
More reasons to try a virtue approach: the relations between believing and feeling – p. 51
An objection to modeling evaluation in epistemology on ethics: the dispute over the voluntariness of belief – p. 58
4.1 The irrelevance of the objection to virtue theory – p. 59
4.2 The voluntariness of belief – p. 61
4.3 Moral and epistemic luck – p. 70
Conclusion to Part I: why center epistemology on the virtues? – p. 73
Part II – A theory of virtue and vice
Types of virtue theories – p. 78
The nature of a virtue – p. 84
2.1 The many notions of virtue – p. 84
2.2 Virtue and the good – p. 89
2.3 Virtues distinguished from natural capacities – p. 92
2.4 Virtues distinguished from skills – p. 96
2.5 Virtue and habit: the transformation machine – p. 106
2.6 Virtues, feelings, and motivations – p. 126
2.7 General account of a virtue – p. 134
Intellectual and moral virtues – p. 137
3.1 Aristotle’s distinction between intellectual and moral virtues – p. 137
3.2 Some connections between intellectual and moral virtues – p. 158
The two components of intellectual virtues – p. 166
4.1 The motivation for knowledge and reliable success – p. 166
4.1.1 The motivation for knowledge – p. 168
4.1.2 The success component of the intellectual virtues – p. 176
4.1.3 Montmarquet on the virtues and truth conduciveness – p. 184
4.1.4 Motivation in excess – p. 194
4.2 The value of the components of intellectual virtues – p. 197
4.2.1 The value of intellectual virtue in a happiness-based theory – p. 197
4.2.2 The value of intellectual virtue in a motivation-based theory – p. 202
The importance of phronesis – p. 211
5.1 Aristotle and Aquinas on practical wisdom – p. 219
5.2 A proposal on the function of phronesis – p. 221
The definition of deontic concepts – p. 229
6.1 Right acts, justified beliefs – p. 234
6.2 Acts of virtue – p. 246
6.3 Beyond duty – p. 253
Conclusion to Part II: the scope of the moral – p. 255
Part III – The nature of knowledge
Knowledge and the ethics of belief – p. 260
Defining knowledge – p. 264
2.1 The definition – p. 264
2.2 High-grade and low-grade knowledge – p. 273
Gettier problems – p. 283
3.1 The problem for JTB theories – p. 283
3.2 Resolving Gettier problems in a virtue theory – p. 290
Reliabilism – p. 299
4.1 Objections to reliabilism – p. 300
4.2 Anticipated objections to my theory from the perspective of reliabilism – p. 311
Plantinga’s theory of proper function – p. 319
Harmonizing internal and external aspects of knowing – p. 329
Conclusion to Part III: ethics, epistemology, and psychology – p. 334
Bibliography – p. 341
Name index – p. 359
Subject index – p. 362
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