Preface XI
PART 1: DIRECT REFERENCE IN LANGUAGE AND
THOUGHT 1
���00 3
1.1 De re communication 5
1 Direct reference and linguistic meaning: rigidity de jure 7
1.1 Introduction 7
1.2 Rigidity and scope 7
1.3 Rigidity and referentiality 10
1.4 Lockwood's criterion 13
1.5 Type-referentiality 16
1.6 Referentiality, meaning, and psychology 19
2 Singular propositions and thoughts 26
2.1 Truth-conditions, meaning, and propositional
content 26
2.2 Content and character: the neo-Russellian theory 28
2.3 Quasi-singular propositions: the neo-Fregean
theory 31
2.4 Propositional content and thought 34
2.5 Two basic intuitions 38
3 The communication of de re thoughts 45
3.1 Introduction 45
3.2 Singular propositions in a neo-Fregean framework 46
3.3 Interpretation in de re communication
3.4 Communication and subjectivity
48
53
1.2 From language to thought 61
4 Linguistic and psychological modes of presentation 63
4.1 Introduction 63
4.2 Linguistic meaning and na"ow content: the
Simplified Picture 66
4.3 Two sorts of mode of presentation 69
4.4 Systematic differences between linguistic and
psychological modes of presentation 72
4.5 Conclusion 76
5 The meaning and cognitive significance of indexical
expresswns 80
5.1 Introduction 80
5.2 Rebutting the constancy argument SO
5.3 The Simplified Picture again 84
5.4 Immunity to e"or through misidentification 87
5.5 Conclusion 90
1.3 De re thoughts 9 5
6 De re modes of presentation 97
6.1 Introduction 97
6.2 Non-descriptiveness and relationality 98
6.3 Non-descriptiveness and truth-conditional
i"elevance 1 03
6.4 Truth-conditional i"elevance and relationality 106
6.5 Non-descriptiveness as descriptive multiplicity 1 09
6.6 Non-descriptiveness and iconicity 1 12
7 Egocentric concepts vs. encyclopedia entries 119
7.1 Introduction 1 19
7.2 Indexicality and perception 120
7.3 From 'buffers' to egocentric concepts 122
7.4 Stable and unstable object files 125
7.5 Conclusion 129
1.4 Proper names 133
8 The meaning of proper names 135
8.1 Introduction 135
8.2 The character of proper names 136
8.3 Proper names as indexicals 140
8.4 Indexicality or homonymy? 143
8.5 Local ness 146
8. 6 The individuation of languages 149
9 Answering Kripke's objections 155
9.1 Introduction 1 55
9.2 The modal argument 155
9.3 The circularity argument 158
9.4 The generality argument 161
9.5 Conclusion 1 65
10 Proper names in thought 1 68
10.1 Introduction 168
10.2 Proper names, sortals, and demonstrative
identification 169
10.3 The psychological neutrality of proper names 172
10.4 Descriptive names 176
10.5 Proper names and encyclopedia entries 181
1.5 The two-component picture: a defence 191
11 Narrow content and psychological explanation 1 93
11.1 Neo-Fregeanism and the two-component
picture 1 93
11.2 Alleged arguments for the two-component
picture 197
11.3 Narrow content in psychological explanation 202
11.4 The empty case 206
12 Externalism and the two-component picture 209
12.1 Can thoughts be schematic? 209
12.2 The externalist objection 21 1
12.3 Two forms of environment-dependence:
the relative notion of narrowness 213
12.4 Second-order narrow contents: the externalist's
dilemma 218
12.5 Holistic Externalism 222
PART II: THE PRAGMATICS OF DIRECT REFERENCE 227
Introduction 229
11.1 Methodological preliminaries 23 1
13 Truth-conditional pragmatics 233
13.1 Enriching the Gricean picture: two sorts
of pragmatic explanation 233
13.2 Three minimalist principles 240
13.3 The Implicature Analysis 244
13.4 The Availability Principle 246
13.5 Conclusion 25 0
14 Primary pragmatic processes 25 5
14.1 Introduction 255
14.2 Can Minima/ism be defended? 256
14.3 Giving up Minima/ism 258
14.4 Primary and secondary pragmatic processes 260
Appendix: Availability and the Scope Principle 269
11.2 Referential/attributive 2 7 5
15 The referential use of definite descriptions 277
15.1 Introduction 277
15.2 Donnellan's presentation 278
15.3 Improper uses and truth-conditional
irrelevance: the intuitive basis of the Naive
Theory 28 1
15.4 An alleged argument for the Implicature
Theory 284
15.5 The Indeterminacy Theory 288
15.6 The Synecdoche Theory 293
16 The descriptive use of indexicals 300
16.1 Introduction 3 00
16.2 Nunberg's counter-examples: de re concepts
in interpretation 301
16.3 Other alleged counter-examples 3 06
16.4 Nunberg's theory: the index/referent
distinction generalized 3 09
16.5 The basic level of interpretation 3 12
16.6 Multi-layered pragmatics and direct reference
theory 316
11.3 Belief reports 323
17 Belief reports and conversational implicatures 325
17.1 Accounting for opacity 325
1 7.2 The Implicature Theory 3 28
17.3 What's wrong with the Implicature Theory (1) 335
17.4 What's wrong with the Implicature Theory (2) 341
18 Belief reports and the semantics of 'that' -clauses 348
18.1 Frege's Puzzle and the Relational principle 348
18.2 Rejecting the Relational principle 350
18.3 The reference of 'that'-clauses 355
18.4 The context-sensitivity of 'that'-clauses 357
19 Comparison with other accounts 368
19.1 Unitary vs. dualist accounts of belief reports 368
19.2 The incoherence of dualism 370
19.3 The combined account 3 75
19.4 Schematic belief reports 3 79
20 How ambiguous are belief sentences? 386
20.1 Introduction 3 86
20.2 Definite descriptions in belief contexts 386
20.3 Proper names in belief contexts 393
20.4 Indexicals in belief contexts 397
Bibliography 403
Index 413
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