Self to Self brings together essays on personal identity, autonomy, and moral emotions by the distinguished philosopher J. David Velleman. Although each of the essays was written as an independent piece, they are unified by an overarching thesis, that there is no single entity denoted by 'the self', as well as by themes from Kantian ethics, psychoanalytic theory, social psychol...
Self to Self brings together essays on personal identity, autonomy, and moral emotions by the distinguished philosopher J. David Velleman. Although each of the essays was written as an independent piece, they are unified by an overarching thesis, that there is no single entity denoted by 'the self', as well as by themes from Kantian ethics, psychoanalytic theory, social psychology, and Velleman's work in the philosophy of action. Two of the essays were selected by the editors of Philosophers' Annual as being among the ten best papers in their year of publication. Aimed primarily at professional philosophers and advanced students, Self to Self will also be of interest to psychologists and others who theorize about the self.
目录
· · · · · ·
Introduction
A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics
The Genesis of Shame
Love as a Moral Emotion
The Voice of Conscience
A Rational Superego
· · · · · ·
(更多)
Introduction
A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics
The Genesis of Shame
Love as a Moral Emotion
The Voice of Conscience
A Rational Superego
Dont Worry Feel Guilty
Self to Self
The Self as Narrator
From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy
The Centered Self
Willing the Law
Motivation by Ideal
Identification and Identity
· · · · · · (收起)
I distinguish among at least three reflexive guises under which a person tends to regard aspects of himself. These three reflexive guises correspond to at least three distinct selves. (查看原文)
As Williams points out, however, this particular way of imagining that I am another person is not really about me or my identity with anyone. If my approach to imagining that I am Napoleon, for example, is to imagine being Napoleon, then I simply imagine a particular situation as experienced by Napoleon. ... Since I’m not imagining anything about my actual self, in this case, I’m certainly not imagining a relation of identity between me and Napoleon. Hence this way of thinking that I am or might be a given person doesn’t establish the conceivability – much less the possibility – of any identities between persons. (查看原文)
首先感叹这个男人是尊神吧，每周读他的东西已经快把我洗脑成kantian了。然后Self to Self这篇最精彩的是第一人称和第三人称的translatability和notional subject as a signal/placeholder。past/future selves的account虽然conceptually coherent，但“只要存在some第一人称体验的identifi...首先感叹这个男人是尊神吧，每周读他的东西已经快把我洗脑成kantian了。然后Self to Self这篇最精彩的是第一人称和第三人称的translatability和notional subject as a signal/placeholder。past/future selves的account虽然conceptually coherent，但“只要存在some第一人称体验的identification就能满足unity of selfhood across time”这个thesis感觉too strong, 很难解释可能伴随transformative experiences的self-alienation+inability to affirm ourselves. (展开)
2 有用 Agilulfo 2021-04-25 12:03:18
想到个路数，拿Self to Self这篇文章里的一些想法作基础，弄出一套自我知识的incremental reading。既能解释透明性（n阶的情况也能搞定），又能避免诸如认知资格一类的讨论。最重要的是，主基调是认知主义的
5 有用 当时环佩留清响 2021-04-24 17:01:19
首先感叹这个男人是尊神吧，每周读他的东西已经快把我洗脑成kantian了。然后Self to Self这篇最精彩的是第一人称和第三人称的translatability和notional subject as a signal/placeholder。past/future selves的account虽然conceptually coherent，但“只要存在some第一人称体验的identifi... 首先感叹这个男人是尊神吧，每周读他的东西已经快把我洗脑成kantian了。然后Self to Self这篇最精彩的是第一人称和第三人称的translatability和notional subject as a signal/placeholder。past/future selves的account虽然conceptually coherent，但“只要存在some第一人称体验的identification就能满足unity of selfhood across time”这个thesis感觉too strong, 很难解释可能伴随transformative experiences的self-alienation+inability to affirm ourselves. (展开)