The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not.The...
The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not.The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.
作者简介
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Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is Professor of Politics at New York University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Alastair Smith is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University.
Randolph M. Siverson is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Davis.
James D. Morrow is Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scie...
Leaders make three related sets of decisions. First, they choose a tax rate that generates government revenue and that influences how hard people work. Second, they spend the revenue raised in a manner designed to help keep incumbents in office, particularly by sustaining support among members of their winning coalition. Finally, they provide various mixes of public and private goods. Private benefits are distributed only to members of the winning coalition and diminish in value to individual coalition members as the size of the group expands. Consequently, as the size of the coalition increases, leaders are expected to shift their effort to the provision of public goods that benefit all in society. (查看原文)
We take as axiomatic that everyone in a position of authority wants to keep that authority and that it is the maneuvering to do so that is central to politics in any type of regime. When we say it is central, we mean that all actions taken by political leaders are intended by them to be compatible with their desire to retain power (Downs 1957; Black 1958; Wintrobe 1998). (查看原文)
瑩瑩_梁
朱懋燊ℵ 朱懋眘
2 有用 lcy 2009-12-27 16:07:21
excellent!最近几期APSR和APJ的论文都以此书结论为起点
0 有用 修昔底德的视野 2010-06-05 13:03:07
理性主义国际关系研究的高阶教科书
0 有用 朱懋燊ℵ 朱懋眘 2020-05-08 13:44:52
遴选集团和胜利联盟虽然比传统的政体划分更逼近现实，但又引发了如何有效度量两者规模的难题。从书中的实证内容来看，两者都是通过其他变量间接度量的。
0 有用 Fernanda 2022-02-15 13:57:53
Impressive
0 有用 味像斋主人 2021-09-27 09:56:44
略了第二章三维政治部分。（独裁者手册原来是作者的通俗写作）
0 有用 9tyfahrenheit 2023-04-19 03:54:09 加拿大
亚左的一生
0 有用 朱古力Coco 2022-06-06 00:34:57
Actually dying to read more empirical studies on authoritarianism survival / breakdown in this summer.
0 有用 Fernanda 2022-02-15 13:57:53
Impressive
0 有用 味像斋主人 2021-09-27 09:56:44
略了第二章三维政治部分。（独裁者手册原来是作者的通俗写作）
0 有用 侯粉 2021-09-14 13:54:53
除了我自己以前的博导，最喜欢的学者就是BdM了。太阳底下无新鲜事，全是这本书的注脚而已。