原始人的每一种禁忌都代表着一种恐惧。毫无疑问，在所有的忌讳中，都存在着对女人的泛化了的恐惧。这种恐惧也许建立在这样的事实之上，即女人与男人不同，她们总是不可思议、神秘兮兮、奇异怪诞，因此，也必然是充满敌意的。男人害怕因女人之故而软弱，因染上女人的特征而变得无能。性交释放了男人的紧张，使他变得软弱乏力，这可能是男人恐惧女人的原始心态……
……我们所描述的每一种禁忌都证明，确实存在着反对爱情的一种力量，那就是因为女人奇怪并且富有敌意。
个体间的分离源于“个人隔离禁忌”。更确切地讲，本该相同但却存在着细微差别的人们，会体验到对方的奇怪与敌视……人际间的敌视成功地战胜了同伴之情及人人互爱的训诫……
Wherever primitive man has set up a taboo he fears some danger and it cannot be disputed that a generalized dread of women is expressed in all these rules of avoidance.
Perhaps this dread is based on the fact that woman is different from man, forever incomprehensible and mysterious, strange and therefore apparently hostile.
The man is afraid of being weakened by the woman, infected with her femininity and of then showing himself incapable.
The effect which coitus has on discharging tensions and causing flaccidity may be the prototype of what the man fears; and realization of the influence which the woman gains over him through sexual intercourse, the consideration she thereby forces from him, may justify the extension of this fear.
In all this there is nothing obsolete, nothing which is not still alive among ourselves.
Many observers of primitive races living to-day have put forward the view that their impulsions in love are relatively weak and never reach the degree of intensity which we are accustomed to meet with in civilized men.
Other observers have contradicted this opinion, but in any case the practice of the taboos we have described testifies to the existence of a force which opposes love by rejecting women as strange and hostile.
Crawley, in language which differs only slightly from the current terminology of psycho-analysis, declares that each individual is separated from the others by a ‘taboo of personal isolation’, and that it is precisely the minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility between them.
It would be tempting to pursue this idea and to derive from this ‘narcissism of minor differences’ the hostility which in every human relation we see fighting successfully against feelings of fellowship and overpowering the commandment that all men should love one another.
Psycho-analysis believes that it has discovered a large part of what underlies the narcissistic rejection of women by men, which is so much mixed up with despising them, in drawing attention to the castration complex and its influence on the opinion in which women are held.引自 处女禁忌
现在让我们来界定“意识”这一概念：它出现在我们的意识中，我们能觉察到，这是“意识”这一术语的唯一含义。
至于潜伏的构念，假如我们有诸多理由设定它们在心理中存在，就如同在记忆中那样，那么就用“潜意识”来表示它。
Now let us call ‘conscious’ the conception which is present to our consciousness and of which we are aware, and let this be the only meaning of the term ‘conscious’.
As for latent conceptions, if we have any reason to suppose that they exist in the mind - as we had in the case of memory - let them be denoted by the term ‘unconscious’.引自 第三卷-精神分析中潜意识的注释
我们习惯于这样认为：每一种潜伏的观念都如此，因为它是微弱的，一旦它变得强大，就会成为有意识的。我们现在确信，有一些潜伏的观念无论它变得如何强大，也不会渗透到意识中来。因此，我们可以将第一种类型的潜伏观念称为前意识，而用潜意识来命名后一种类型，即我们在神经症中研究的那一种类型。潜意识这一术语以往只在纯粹的描述意义上使用，现在则蕴涵着更多的内容。它不但指一般的潜伏观念，而且特别还指那些具有一定动力性质的观念；这些观念尽管强烈而活跃，但却仍不能进入意识。
We feel justified in making our classification agree with this addition to our knowledge by introducing a fundamental distinction between different kinds of latent or unconscious ideas. We were accustomed to think that every latent idea was so because it was weak and that it grew conscious as soon as it became strong. We have not gained the conviction that there are some latent ideas which do not penetrate into consciousness, however strong they may have become. Therefore we may call the latent ideas of the first type foreconscious, while we reserve the term unconscious (proper) for the latter type which we came to study in the neuroses. The term unconscious, which was used in the purely descriptive sense before, now comes to imply something more. It designates not only latent ideas in general, but especially ideas with a certain dynamic character, ideas keeping apart from consciousness in spite of their intensity and activity.引自 精神分析中潜意识的注释
潜意识活动的产物进入意识并非绝不可能，但要实现这一目标得付出极大的努力。当我们想做到这一点时，就会明显地觉察到一种拒斥感……我们将其称为抵抗。……潜意识观念是被一些活力排斥到意识之外的，这些活力反对它们自己被意识所接受；但并不反对其他观念，即前意识观念……在构建我们心理活动的过程中，潜意识是一种正常的、不可避免的阶段；每一种心理活动一开始都是潜意识的，它或者保持一如既往的状态，或者发展成为意识，这取决于它是否遇到抵抗。前意识与潜意识活动之间的区别并不是原来就有的，而是在抵抗产生后出现的……
So we learn that the unconscious idea is excluded from consciousness by living forces which oppose themselves to its reception, while they do not object to other ideas, the foreconscious ones. Psycho-analysis leaves no room for doubt that the repulsion from unconscious ideas is only provoked by the tendencies embodied in their contents. The next and most probable theory which can be formulated at this stage of our knowledge is the following. Unconsciousness is a regular and inevitable phase in the processes constituting our psychical activity; every psychical act begins as an unconscious one, and it may either remain so or go on developing into consciousness, according as it meets with resistance or not. The distinction between foreconscious and unconscious activity is not a primary one, but comes to be established after repulsion has sprung up.引自 精神分析中潜意识的注释
我们有权力拒不使用“下意识”这个词，因为这一称呼是错误的，且易引起误解。有名的“意识分裂”病例，与我们的观点也不矛盾。
We shall also be right in rejecting the term ‘subconsciousness’ as incorrect and misleading. The well-known cases of ‘double conscience’¹ (splitting of consciousness) prove nothing against our view. We may most aptly describe them as cases of a splitting of the mental activities into two groups, and say that the same consciousness turns to one or the other of these groups alternately.引自 论潜意识-（一）对潜意识概念的辩护
在我们看来，精神分析关于存在着一种潜意识心理活动的假说，一方面是原始的泛灵论的扩展，它使我们在周围事物中觉知自身，另一方面又是康德对于各种关于外部知觉的种种错误看法之批驳的延续。
The psycho-analytic assumption of unconscious mental activity appears to us, on the one hand, as a further expansion of the primitive animism which caused us to see copies of our own consciousness all around us, and, on the other hand, as an extension of the corrections undertaken by Kant of our views on external perception. Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable, so psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object.引自 论潜意识-（一）对潜意识概念的辩护
……先让我们讲清一个重要却易令人困惑的事实，进入潜意识状态的本性仅仅是精神活动的一个特征，并且还非它的一个最典型的特征。
…let us state the important, though inconvenient, fact that the attribute of being unconscious is only one feature that is found in the psychical and is by no means sufficient fully to characterize it.
There are psychical acts of very varying value which yet agree in possessing the characteristic of being unconscious.引自 论潜意识-（二）“潜意识”的各种不同含义——一种地形学的观点
当一种心理活动（在这里我们将这一心理活动限定为一种观念活动）从Ucs系统进入Cs（或Pcs）系统时，我们能否认定这种转换含有上述观念的新记载，也就是说该观念的第二次进入。这样它或许位于一个新的心理位置，并且原有的潜意识内容与它并存呢？
或者我们是否还可认为，这种转换主要是此观念自身状态的变化，亦即同一种材料的变化并发生在同一位置上？
When a psychical act (let us confine ourselves here to one which is in the nature of an idea) is transposed from the system Ucs. into the system Cs. (or Pcs.), are we to suppose that this transposition involves a fresh record - as it were, a second registration - of the idea in question, which may thus be situated as well in a fresh psychical locality, and alongside of which the original unconscious registration continues to exist?
Or are we rather to believe that the transposition consists in a change in the state of the idea, a change involving the same material and occurring in the same locality? 引自 论潜意识-（二）“潜意识”的各种不同含义——一种地形学的观点
This question may appear abstruse, but it must be raised if we wish to form a more definite conception of psychical topography, of the dimension of depth in the mind.
It is a difficult one because it goes beyond pure psychology and touches on the relations of the mental apparatus to anatomy. We know that in the very roughest sense such relations exist. Research has given irrefutable proof that mental activity is bound up with the function of the brain as it is with no other organ. We are taken a step further - we do not know how much - by the discovery of the unequal importance of the different parts of the brain and their special relations to particular parts of the body and to particular mental activities.
But every attempt to go on from there to discover a localization of mental processes, every endeavour to think of ideas as stored up in nerve-cells and of excitations as travelling along nerve-fibres, has miscarried completely. The same fate would await any theory which attempted to recognize, let us say, the anatomical position of the system Cs. - conscious mental activity - as being in the cortex, and to localize the unconscious processes in the sub-cortical parts of the brain.
There is a hiatus here which at present cannot be filled, nor is it one of the tasks of psychology to fill it. 引自 论潜意识-（二）“潜意识”的各种不同含义——一种地形学的观点
我们的心理地形学目前与解剖学没有什么牵连，心理地形学与之有关不是解剖学上的位置，而是位于身体任何一个部位的心理器官的内部区域。
Our psychical topography has for the present nothing to do with anatomy; it has reference not to anatomical localities, but to regions in the mental apparatus, wherever they may be situated in the body.
P2998引自 论潜意识-（二）“潜意识”的各种不同含义——一种地形学的观点
我本人实际的看法是，潜意识与意识的对立并不适用于本能。本能永远不能成为意识的对象——只有能再现本能的观念才能成为意识的对象。
I am in fact of the opinion that the antithesis of conscious and unconscious is not applicable to instincts. An instinct can never become an object of consciousness - only the idea that represents the instinct can. 引自 论潜意识-（三）潜意识情绪
Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea. If the instinct did not attach itself to an idea or manifest itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it.
When we nevertheless speak of an unconscious instinctual impulse or of a repressed instinctual impulse, the looseness of phraseology is a harmless one. We can only mean an instinctual impulse the ideational representative of which is unconscious, for nothing else comes into consideration.引自 论潜意识-（三）潜意识情绪
……某种情绪的本质在于我们对情绪的知觉，也就是说情绪应该被意识到……
… It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should be aware of it, i.e. that it should become known to consciousness. 引自 论潜意识-（三）潜意识情绪
所以在阐析潜意识的性质时，应该责无旁贷地把情绪、情感、感情等包容在内……（完全翻译错误）
Thus the possibility of the attribute of unconsciousness would be completely excluded as far as emotions, feelings and affects are concerned…
P3000
引自 论潜意识-（三）潜意识情绪
At the outset he was in a passive situation - he was overpowered by the experience; but, by repeating it, unpleasurable though it was, as a game, he took on an active part. These efforts might be put down to an instinct for mastery that was acting independently of whether the memory was in itself pleasurable or not….We are therefore left in doubt as to whether the impulse to work over in the mind some overpowering experience so as to make oneself master of it can find expression as a primary event, and independently of the pleasure principle.引自 【超越快乐原则】第二章
