笔记

P12 To do so in English, a language natively hostile to certain orders of abstruseness and metaphoric abstraction, is well-nigh impossible.

P24 Questions, and this too is a Heideggerian postulate, are only worth asking of that which is worth questioning, of that "which is questionable in a sense implying not the guarantee of an answer, but at least that of an informing response. "

P24 The Greek language and it alone, is logos . . . . In the Greek language what is said is at the same time , and in an eminent way, that which it is called ( designated as ) . If we hear a Greek word with a Greek ear, we follow its legein ( its speaking) , its direct , immediate presentation of what it says.（语言的召唤性。神说：“要有光”，于是便有了光。）

being is Being.(在者存在。)

P30 "Being as such determines speaking in such a way that language is attuned to the Being of being"

P31 The common bond is that of astonishment.

P32 For Heidegger, on the contrary, the human person and self-consciousness are not the center, the assessors of existence. Man is only a privileged listener and respondent to existence.

P36 "To philosophize is to ask : 'Why are there essents rather than nothing ? ' " From the point of view of faith, such a question is folly, but "philosophy is this very foolishness."

P45 In German the noun "being" is Sein and the verb "to be" is sein . As in French, etre and etre, the noun is identical with the infinitive of the verb . In English , it is identical with a participial form . In other words, Sein, the verbal noun for ''being," is at its syntactic base a process, an activity, a ''being-there. " The noun is , as it were , the momentary pause or fiction of an act ; it has the same linguistic form as the act because the latter is wholly operative within it.

P47 In many respects, Sein und Zeit is an attempt to separate the authenticity of "being" from the factitiousness of "existence."

P68 Being does not--it cannot, we are told--reveal itself outside the being in which it lodges and which it illumines."Being," says Richardson, "contracts into the beings it makes manifest and hides by the very fact that it reveals.”

P78 Already Augustine had warned against the obsessive concupiscentia oculorum (眼的欲求)of philosophers, their Platonic insistence on "seeing" the essence of things instead of experiencing it with total existential commitment and patience-which commitment entails a realization of the time-bound nature of being.

P79 Instead of the Platonic "illumination from outside," with its archetypal figure of the eye reaching out to an object along an exploratory light-ray, we shall have what Heidegger calls die Lichtung , the "clearing," in which truth is experienced, not perceived, as part and parcel of the "facticity" ( Tatsiichlichkeit) and historicity ( Geschichtlichkeit ) of man's existence. We must labor not only to reach this clearing but to dwell in it.

P85 Knowing is a kind of being. Knowledge is not some mysterious leap from subject to object and back again. "The perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness" (observe how Heidegger fixes on the aggressive, exploitative strain in the classical model of the acquisition of knowledge). It is, on the contrary, a form of being-with, a concern (a concept that will be detailed later on) with and inside the world.

P86 But even as knowledge does not create the world, nor forgetting obliterate it (propositions in which Heidegger is, massively, on the side of common sense), so it must follow that Dasein only discovers itself as it grasps reality. What are the main categories of such grasping? ( Begriff, meaning “concept," is built on Griff, the literal , manual grasp of something. ) Heidegger calls these categories Existenzialien.

P88 Thought is only one of the articulations（表达） of Dasein.

P88 The world comes at us, answers Heidegger, in the form and manner of things. But of the obviously innumerable object-entities that Dasein encounters, those that will constitute its being-in-the-world are not just any things. They are what the Greeks called pragmata, "that is to say, that which one has to do with in one's concernful dealings." Heidegger's word for pragmata is Zeug . It, at times, has been translated as "equipment", "instrumentation", outillage. Its principal German derivative is Werkzeug, meaning "tool". The distinction between "anything" and Zeug is essential to Heidegger's entire world-view. Vorhandenheit, which signifies "presentness-at-hand," is the character of the object "out there." It characterizes the matter of theoretic speculation, of scientific study. Thus "Nature" is vorhanden to the physicist and rocks are vorhanden to the geologist. But this is not how a stonemason or a sculptor meets up with a rock. His relationship to stone, the relationship crucial to his Dasein, is that of Zuhandenheit, of a "readiness-to-hand" (observe the formidable gap which separates at from to in the two instrumental terms). That which is zuhanden, literally "to-hand", reveals itself to Dasein, is taken up by and into Dasein, in ways absolutely constitutive of the "thereness" into which our existence has been thrown and in which it must accomplish its being. (手工艺的切身性。同时也意味着非自明性。)

沉沦，不是价值取向的问题，纯粹是技术问题。

只有将社会责任均分，本真性存在才能广泛。

P115 Man, moreover, is not the enforcer, the opener of truth (as Aristotle, Bacon, or Descartes would have him), but the "opening for it," the "clearing" or Lichtung in which it will make its hiddenness manifest .

P128 Language is proper to man, not simply because with his other faculties man also "has" [writes Richardson] the power of speech, but because he has a privileged access to Being. By the same token, the function of his language is simply to let Being be itself. Conversely, it is because other beings do not have this special access to Being that they cannot talk. If the use of language for modern man has become banal, the reason is not to seek on moral or aesthetic grounds but in the fact that the genuine nature of man and his essential relationship to Being remain in oblivion.