阿伦特：《康德政治哲学讲稿》读书笔记

“康德从未写过某种政治哲学”【15】（he never wrote a political philosophy. p.7.）阿伦特认为康德很晚才逐渐意识到与社会性截然有别的政治性是人的在世状况中不可或缺的重要部分，但此时已近迟暮，无力也无暇就此论题经营自己的哲学。【19】（p.9.）注意到康德《道德底形上学》出版，从全新的观念即判断力中收回了道德命题。“对美与丑作出评定的，不只有品位；但是，关于正确与错误的问题，既不是由品位来评定的，也不是由判断力来评定，而仅由理性对之加以评定。”【20】（he withdrew moral propositions from the competence of this new faculty. In other words: it is now more than taste that will decide about the beautiful and the ugly; but the question of right and wrong is to be decided by neither taste nor judgment but by reason alone. p.10.）康德遗留的两个问题：（1）人的“社会性”【20】（2）如何把一个民族组织成为一个国家，如何构制这个国家，如何创建一个共和国，以及与此相关的所有法律上的难题【28】（It is precisely this problem of how to organize a people into a state, how to constitute the state, how to found a commonwealth, and all the legal problems connected with these questions, that occupied him constantly during his last years. p.16.）注意阿伦特认为“他知道他的道德哲学对此可能一点忙也帮不上，因此，他远离一切道德说教”，并分判好人与好公民，将道德性与好公民剥离【30】[And the surprising fact is that he knew that his moral philosophy could not help here. Thus he kept away from all moralizing and understood that the problem was how to force man "to be a good citizen even if [he is] not a morally good person" and that "a good constitution is not to be expected from morality, but, conversely, a good moral condition of a people is to be expected under a good constitution." This may remind you of Aristotle's remark that a "good man can be a good citizen only in a good state," except that Kant concludes (and this is so surprising and goes far beyond Aristotle in separating morality from good citizenship) p.17.] 康德对公开性/公共性的强调【32】他所理解的社会性的两个要素是可较流行和公共性/公开性，但并没有把行动纳入考虑。【33】提及政治与哲学的关系。【35-6】指出康德与前贤的诸分野在于对待生和死的态度。【37】区分三种视角：人类种族及其进步；作为道德存在着的人，其本身就是目的；复数的/多元化的人，其真正的目的在于社会性【43】康德赞同亚里士多德反对柏拉图哲人王的观点，但抛弃了亚里士多德的等级结构（哲学的生活方式是最高的），政治与哲学的张力彻底消失，结果是政治亦即必须要写作出某一种政治哲学来为疯癫收容所订立规则均不再是哲学家亟待完成的事。【47】[He agrees with Aristotle, against Plato, that the philosophers should not rule but that rulers should be willing to listen to the philosophers. 61 But he disagrees with Aristotle's view that the philosophical way of life is the highest and that the political way of life, in the last analysis, exists for the sake of the bios thedretikos. With the abandonment of this hierarchy, which is the abandonment of all hierarchical structures, the old tension between politics and philosophy disappears altogether. The result is that politics, and the necessity to write a political philosophy to lay down the rules for an "insane asylum," ceases to be an urgent business for the philosopher. p.29.] 康德有政治哲学，但没有将其下颚出来；并指出应当在他的全部著作，而非编选在这一标题下的零星文章中找到【49】讨论“批判”这一术语，指出批判性思索的艺术一直都有着政治义蕴【59】对康德而言，最重要的政治自由不是哲学的自由（斯宾诺莎），而是表达和出版的；政治自由被他定义为在任何时候都能公开运用自己的理性【61】批判性视为必然意味着可交流性；而可交流性必然意味着复数的人组成的共同体【63】讨论康德与法国大革命【68-70】注意指出康德的世界公民实际上是一个世界的旁观者；可以想象到的最坏的僭政莫过于一个世界性的政府【68】（Kant's world citizen was actually a Weltbetrachter, a world-spectator. Kant knew quite well that a world government would be the worst tyranny imaginable. p.44.）政治与道德性的冲突，阿伦特指出两个假设使康德避开冲突，一是“作为个体的人是在进步的”【77】二是恶就其本性而言是自我毁灭的【78】阿伦特总结道康德文本中的两个因素，观者的立场，唯有旁观者而非行动者才知道一切；进步之理念，也就是对未来的希望【82-3】历史则是嵌入“人”这一种族的某种东西；人的本质是无法确定的。“康德道德哲学的中心是个体；他的历史哲学（或者不如说他的自然哲学）的中心则是人类族群的或人类的永久进步（因而也就是：从一般视角所看到的的历史）。占据一般视角或一般化的立足点的，是旁观者，他是一个‘世界公民’，或者不如说，一个‘世界的旁观者’。正是这抱持一种整体理念的旁观者，在判定任何一件单独的、特殊的事件中是不是有进步在发生。”【88】[In the center of Kant's moral philosophy stands the individual; in the center of his philosophy of history (or, rather, his philosophy of nature) stands the perpetual progress of the human race, or mankind. (Therefore: History from a general viewpoint.) The general viewpoint or standpoint is occupied, rather, by the spectator, who is a "world citizen" or, rather, a "world spectator." It is he who decides, by having an idea of the whole, whether, in any single, particular event, progress is being made. p.58.] 理论与实践，旁观者与行动者的区分；旁观者优先，特别考察审美判断力批判。想象力和共同感觉。判断中的两个心智运作过程：想象力的运作过程；反思的运作过程；二者为所有判断建立了最为重要的条件，即不偏不倚、无兴趣无利益的愉悦【102】康德的矛盾，无限进步是人类种族的法，人的尊严则要求个体的特殊性被看到，相信进步有违人类尊严；且进步意味着故事永远没有终点/目的【117】（In Kant himself there is this contradiction: Infinite Progress is the law of the human species; at the same time, man's dignity demands that he be seen (every single one of us) in his particularity and, as such, be seen—but without any comparison and independent of time—as reflecting mankind in general. In other words, the very idea of progress—if it is more than a change in circumstances and an improvement of the world—contradicts Kant's notion of man's dignity. It is against human dignity to believe in progress. Progress, moreover, means that the story never has an end. The end of the story itself is in infinity. There is no point at which we might stand still and look back with the backward glance of the historian. p.77.）