由本书所生发的问题以及作者本人的回应

本文是迈克尔·沃尔泽来访时我所使用的评议稿。座谈分两部分，前半部分讨论《正义诸领域》（是由别人进行的评议）、后半部分讨论《论宽容》（即本书）。因此，以下文字在一定程度上具有书评性质，概括了全书的内容、突出了本书的优点、并提出了三个供沃尔泽回应的问题。文后附上了沃尔泽本人对这些问题的回应。限于座谈会与评议稿各自具有的性质，评议稿所涉及的内容无法完全随心所欲。错谬与不足之处还望读者海涵。 It is suspected that concision and profundity do not often go hand in hand. Professor Walzer's On Toleration, however, is surely an exception. Within merely a hundred and twelve pages, Professor Walzer defines the concept of toleration that he intends to develop in this book, indicates the theoretical and practical importance of this concept, surveys five typical regimes of toleration throughout human history and four complicated cases in our time, discusses seven practical issues that any studies of toleration must not ignore, including power, class, gender, religion, education, civil religion, and tolerating the intolerant, criticizes one postmodern view of toleration, and, last but not least, reflects on the two somewhat conflicting social trends in the multicultural society of the United States today, one seeking to strengthen group identities, the other seeking to reinforce individual freedom. None of these diverse topics is trivial, as shown in the fact that even though the book was published almost twenty years ago, readers today still find its concerns relevant, its perspectives fresh, and its conclusions insightful. Among all the merits of On Toleration, I would like to point out one that particularly deserves our attention, theoretical and prudential. Unlike what Professor Walzer calls the proceduralist treatment of philosophical arguments, which begins with an ideal situation and is therefore far less contextualized, the discussion of toleration in this book is deeply embedded in human history, and therefore shows an admirable awareness of global differences and sensitivity to the changing circumstances of the world. Readers should not expect to learn from this book a uniform account of toleration or a universal solution to the problem of the lack of toleration. By first abstracting five different possibilities of tolerant regimes from concrete human history and then discussing the practical issues concerning toleration accordingly, Professor Walzer shows us that the same issue occurring in different regimes can, and should be addressed in completely different ways. Take the issue of power as an example: in multinational empires, toleration among local groups is more secured when power is better centralized in the hands of imperial bureaucrats, trying to impartially adjudicate local disputes, whereas in modern nation-states, where power rests with the majority nation, the identities of minority groups are gravely endangered if these minority groups are too weak to sustain their own cultures and ways of life. Since different answers to the question "who tolerates whom?" make a huge difference to the effectiveness of policies of toleration, concentration of power, taken abstractly, can hardly explain why toleration fares badly here but not there. Moreover, Professor Walzer even doubts whether toleration itself can be uniformly defined. He points out five different attitudes that can be equally understood as possibilities of tolerance. In the face of different opinions and practices of others, we may hold the attitudes of resignation, indifference, stoicism, curiosity, or enthusiasm. While all these attitudes may contribute to the peaceful co-existence of groups of people with different histories, cultures, and identities, none of them is effective under all social and political circumstances, or absolutely better than the rest. On Toleration, therefore, helps us appreciate the nuances and subtleties in the topic of toleration. These nuances and subtleties are desperately needed today, as the European refugee crisis, among many examples, brings both hope and fear to the future of multiculturalism and global diversity, whereas scholars who hold different understandings of toleration in the face of global diversity find it difficult to reconcile with each other on the purely theoretical level, some endorsing toleration based upon mutual respect, some endorsing toleration that serves the purpose of the realization of individual autonomy, and some endorsing toleration that asks for nothing more than a modus vivendi peace among groups of people. On Toleration is a thought-provoking book, not only because of its impressive merits, but also because of its openness to further theoretical discussions. As I just mentioned, contemporary debates about toleration are far from being settled. Questions can be raised from different perspectives concerning the nature of toleration and the relation between toleration and other relevant concepts. I will suggest three of them. First, strictly speaking, On Toleration is not about toleration per se but about "the peaceful coexistence of groups of people with different histories, cultures, and identities, which," as Professor Walzer claims, "is what toleration makes possible." Therefore, peaceful coexistence seems to be the outcome of toleration. However, with regard to the relation between toleration and peace, some scholars in the camp of British political realists argue the reverse. Their point of view is that peace is the prerequisite of toleration, not its outcome. Toleration is what peace makes possible. If we follow the line of the argument that sees toleration mainly as the outcome of peace, then we may reach the conclusion that, in the time of violent conflicts, toleration cannot help us put an end to these conflicts because it is exactly the absence of these conflicts that effective toleration requires. The lack of peace, therefore, is perhaps not the sign of failure of toleration, and its causes have nothing to do with toleration or the lack of it. Similar arguments may also be found in Marxist worldviews or writings of some critical theorists. They challenge the value of toleration itself. To be sure, in practice, toleration and peace can be seen as mutually reinforcing, and the wholesale challenge to the value of toleration may seem to be too much. Nevertheless, this challenge raises a normative question concerning the limit of toleration: Is toleration something valuable all the time, or are there any circumstances, or perhaps any other "spheres" of life, in which toleration must be superseded by some other priorities and thus appears relatively less valuable? And this question may be even more pressing for On Toleration, as the section of the book called "Tolerating the Intolerant" argues that toleration always means tolerating the intolerant, which argument, for some people, may mean that the line between the tolerable and the intolerable is blurred. So I was wondering if Professor Walzer might want to develop a bit about your idea of the limit of toleration. Is it completely history-dependent, or is there any rough but recognizable guideline for us to distinguish between the tolerable and the absolutely intolerable? Second, I am also curious about the relation between political principle and personal morality, which, in the present case, is embodied in the relation between toleration and tolerance. While toleration is understood as a "practice," and a very much political one, tolerance is a personal "attitude" that may lead people to treasure toleration not merely as a means, but also as an end. The interesting thing here is that toleration among people does not necessarily require that these people are tolerant. Individuals may be intolerant, but as long as they are restrained from behaving in ways driven by their intolerance, such as forcefully imposing their wills onto others, the society in which they live can still be called a society of toleration. In this sense, toleration is a matter of institutional designs that protect freedom of individuals or groups of individuals, and in none of the five tolerant regimes depicted in On Toleration is personal tolerance of every single individual, not to mention mutual respect, an absolutely necessary condition. However, critics, perhaps the proceduralists that Professor Walzer points out at the very beginning of On Toleration, may argue that the kind of toleration devoid of tolerance, or at least the kind of toleration devoid of mutual respect, is insufficient. They may say that such toleration is a mere modus vivendi that has no moral value. It is just a game where equilibria are sensitive to the slightest change of circumstances and therefore not stable. For them, therefore, the political principle of toleration cannot be severed from the personal morality of tolerance. Since On Toleration says very little about potential proceduralist criticism and about the relation between toleration and tolerance, between political principle and personal morality, I was wondering if Professor Walzer might give some comments on these issues. Third, in the epilogue of the book, Professor Walzer analyzes the two social trends that coexist in contemporary American society. While one trend claims the necessity to strengthen group identities and articulate group differences, the other trend demands the protection of individual freedom from stereotypical impressions that individuals inadvertently inherit from their social groups. While one trend emphasizes toleration of social groups, the other trend stresses toleration of individuals. Apparently, these two trends are in tension with each other, as one trend aims to underline the social significance of groups, whereas the other aims to diminish this significance. Faced with these two conflicting trends, Professor Walzer argues for a balance. But this balance still tilts toward the strengthening of group identity, because individuals radically atomized and detached from groups are rootless and thereby weak, perhaps too weak to truly realize the freedom with which they are endowed. Rather, it is in groups that individuals are empowered. Therefore, despite the fact that demagogues may take advantage of group identities so as to advance their own interests, Professor Walzer believes that empowering individuals by strengthening their group identities is in general beneficial to building a tolerant America, as these individuals will be the best guardians of public interests against demagogues. This defense of group differences is very well argued and may be convincing even to some conservatives today who complain about the excess of political correctness. Nevertheless, I wonder if this defense presupposes a dichotomy between groups and individuals and therefore leaves out another possibility that may be called "collective individualism," to borrow the term that Tocqueville employs to describe French urban life before 1789. That is, different social groups keep asserting their uniqueness to the extent that they begin to divide within themselves and become numerous fragmented groups that are in fact as weak as alienated individuals. The possibility of collective individualism shows us how articulating group differences may lead to unprecedented results. In fact, this possibility may be even suggested in the preface of On Toleration where Professor Walzer states the following: "As an American Jew, I grew up thinking of myself as an object of toleration. It was only much later that I recognized myself as a subject too, an agent called upon to tolerate others, including fellow Jews whose idea of what Jewishness meant differed radically from my own." Would Jewish community, or any community in the United States break into smaller groups in future? Is this a real possibility? If so, what circumstances in American society today may contribute to the realization of this possibility? If not, what social circumstances may prevent it, or what theoretical arguments may falsify it? These are the three questions that I have for Professor Walzer concerning the book On Toleration. The first is about the limit of toleration; the second is about the relation between toleration and tolerance, between political principle and personal morality; and the third is about the possibility of collective individualism as an unintended result of articulating group differences. In general, On Toleration is another masterpiece written by one of the most eminent political theorists today that keeps inspiring its readers. 针对第一个问题（宽容的限度），沃尔泽认为，自由主义的宽容政体最突出的特点在于结社自由。除此之外，宽容的限度是依具体情势而定的、不能一概而论。他以青少年教育问题为例，认为在这个问题上，宽容的限度在于认识到，这些青少年长大成人后会成为公民，因此对他们的教育好坏关乎到社会的切身利益。因此，教学内容的设计安排，便要以这一切身利益为底线。 针对第二个问题（宽容与宽容心之间、政治原则与个人道德之间的关系），沃尔泽确认了社会的宽容（toleration）的确不必依赖于公民个体的宽容心（tolerance）。但是，这并不是说，一个宽容的社会可以由一群毫不宽容的公民构成。倘若宽容社会得以维持下去，那么，这个社会便需要存在至少一部分的人，具有较高程度的宽容心（也就是要对不同群体的文化具有好奇心乃至热情）。沃尔泽没有详谈政治原则与个人道德之间的关系问题。 针对第三个问题（群体与个体之间的关系、强调群体身份差异是否有可能导致群体内部不断撕裂），沃尔泽的回应有些偏离问题本身。他强调了群体身份与个体自由之间具有的张力，这尤其体现在群体支持那些严重限制个人自由的价值之时。面对极端群体，个人自由的重要性就超过了对这些群体的保护所具有的重要性。 沃尔泽的这些回应的目的，不在于给出确定无疑的答案。他重申了他一贯坚持的主张：对政治理论问题的理解和研究，必须要结合对具体情势的细致理解与分析才行；抽象程度过高是没有意义的。——至于这个观点是否正确、是否令人满意，就见仁见智了。