In the early 20th century, Marxist theory was enriched and rejuvenated by adopting the concept of reification, introduced by the Hungarian theorist Georg Lukacs to identify and denounce the transformation of historical processes into ahistorical entities, human actions into things that seemed part of an immutable "second nature." For a variety of reasons, both theoretical and p...
In the early 20th century, Marxist theory was enriched and rejuvenated by adopting the concept of reification, introduced by the Hungarian theorist Georg Lukacs to identify and denounce the transformation of historical processes into ahistorical entities, human actions into things that seemed part of an immutable "second nature." For a variety of reasons, both theoretical and practical, the hopes placed in de-reification as a tool of revolutionary emancipation proved vain. In these original and imaginative essays, delivered as the Tanner Lectures at the University of California, Berkeley in 2005, the distinguished third-generation Frankfurt School philosopher Axel Honneth attempts to rescue the concept of reification by recasting it in terms of the philosophy of recognition he has been developing over the past two decades. Three distinguished political and social theorists: Judith Butler, Raymond Geuss, and Jonathan Lear, respond with hard questions about the central anthropological premise of his argument, the assumption that prior to cognition there is a fundamental experience of intersubjective recognition that can provide a normative standard by which current social relations can be judged wanted. Honneth listens carefully to their criticism and provides a powerful defense of his position.
（1）在发展心理学与社会化研究中早已普遍认为，幼儿思考及与人互动能力之发展乃是一个以观点认取机制（ Mechanismus der Perspektivibernahme）为中介的过程。这一想法可以说是融合皮亚杰（ Jean Piaget）与乔治H·米德（ George HMead），或说是融合戴维森（ Donald Davidson）与弗洛伊徳所得来。根据此观点，在儿童发展的过程中，认知能力的习得和早期的沟通关系以一种独特的方式紧密相关：儿童之所以能学会将自我关联到一个有着稳定且持存对象物的客观世界，是因为他藉助第二人的观看视角，慢慢地学会将自己原来的、自我中心的视角去中心化（ Dezentrisierung）——婴儿很早就开始和照护者建立起沟通关系，他会要照护者看着自己，并会将照护者的目光引向重要的对象物上。诸多理论认为，这种现象指向一个探索实验的阶段，在此阶段中，婴儿会试探其他的观看周遭世界的方式是否具有独立性。若婴儿要成功学会将自己设身置于第二人的观点，且能以此第二人观点看待周遭环境，他需要有一个和自己相系相应的他人为范准（ correlative natanz），透过这个重要他者，婴オ第一次能以一种去个人化的（ entpersonlicht）、客观的方式看待对象物。今日普遍认为，婴儿掌握此种“人际认知三角”（ Triangu lierung）的时间点是在九个月大的时候，新近的研究因此提出“九月革命”的说法，因为在这个年龄，小孩开始有能力觉察其他行动者的意向，知道其他人面对周遭世界时也带着目标，因此他人的立场和自己的立场具有同样的重要性。
值得注意的是，在这些发展心理学的理论中——例如当米德或戴维森强调“观点认取”对于儿童发展符号性思考的必要性时——儿童与照护者关系中的情感层面在相当程度上被忽略了。我们在米德的理论中就已经可以看出这种倾向。当米德描绘幼儿早期... (查看原文)
By discussing what Lukács cannot mean by reifi cation, it is starting to become clearer how he does in fact intend this key concept to be understood. If reifi cation constitutes neither a mere epistemic category mistake nor a form of moral misconduct, the only remaining possibility is that it be conceived as a form of praxis that is structurally false. The detached, neutrally observing mode of behavior, which Lukács attempts to conceptualize as “reifi cation,” must form an ensemble of habits and attitudes that deviates from a more genuine or better form of human praxis. This way of formulating the issue makes it clear that this conception of reifi cation is in no way free of all normative implications. Although we are not dealing with a simple violation of moral principles, we are indeed c... (查看原文)
哲夫成城
华东师范大学出版社2018版
理一分殊
Oxford University Press2008版
跑
华东师范大学出版社2018版
1 有用 Hier Tanze 2025-05-06 15:51:40 上海
再读，细读了批评与回应部分。霍耐特的讲座似乎置先验承认于某种乐观的人类学位置，将先验承认与一种对他人的原初情感投注联系在一起，并强调其中隐含的道德价值和规范性源地。三位批评者均反对这一单一化图景，强调先验承认是矛盾的，既可以导向爱与道德，也可以走向控制、仇恨与侵凌。如海德格尔所言，Sorge乃是一种伦理中立的存在论状态。霍耐特在回复中，坚持自己的先验承认亦是某种前伦理的存在论，它是爱与恨、矛盾与冷... 再读，细读了批评与回应部分。霍耐特的讲座似乎置先验承认于某种乐观的人类学位置，将先验承认与一种对他人的原初情感投注联系在一起，并强调其中隐含的道德价值和规范性源地。三位批评者均反对这一单一化图景，强调先验承认是矛盾的，既可以导向爱与道德，也可以走向控制、仇恨与侵凌。如海德格尔所言，Sorge乃是一种伦理中立的存在论状态。霍耐特在回复中，坚持自己的先验承认亦是某种前伦理的存在论，它是爱与恨、矛盾与冷漠的条件，后来的各种规范性的实质性承认形式乃是由先验承认所开辟的经验存在论计划得到历史性填充的各种方式。这虽然可以回应异议，却也把自己的工作收缩了——先验承认仅仅是海德格尔范式在主体间问题上的简单延伸，其中没有实质的人类学内涵，而物化只能用来描述非常极端的处境。霍耐特无法回应本体论策略的稀薄的异议。 (展开)