A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory-the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering...
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory-the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
作者简介
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Thomas Crombie Schelling (born 14 April 1921) is an American economist and professor of foreign affairs, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park. He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (shared with Robert Aumann) for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and ...
Thomas Crombie Schelling (born 14 April 1921) is an American economist and professor of foreign affairs, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park. He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (shared with Robert Aumann) for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis."
Schelling received his bachelor's degree in economics from the University of California, Berkeley in 1944. He received his PhD in economics from Harvard University in 1951.
He served with the Marshall Plan in Europe, the White House, and the Executive Office of the President from 1948 to 1953. He wrote most of his dissertation on national income behavior working at night while in Europe. He left government to join the economics faculty at Yale University, and in 1958 he was appointed Professor of Economics at Harvard. In 1969 he joined the Kennedy School at Harvard University. Dr. Schelling taught for twenty years at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, being the Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, as well as conducted research at IIASA, in Laxenburg, Austria between 1994 and 1999.
目录
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I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy
1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy
2. An Essay on Bargaining
3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War
II. A Reorientation of Game Theory
4. Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision
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I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy
1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy
2. An Essay on Bargaining
3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War
II. A Reorientation of Game Theory
4. Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision
5. Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves
6. Game Theory and Experimental Research
III. Strategy with a Random Ingredient
7. Randomization of Promises and Threats
8. The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance
IV. Surprise Attack: A Study in Mutual Distrust
9. The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack
10. Surprise Attack and Disarmament
Appendices
A. Nuclear Weapons and Limited War
B. For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory
C. Re-interpretation of a Solution Concept for "Noncooperative" Games Index
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The power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself. In bargaining, weakness is often strength. To burn bridges behind one may suffice to undo an opponent.
谢林的书有多经典就不谈了，这里就谈谈翻译有多恐怖吧，意思完全就翻译反了，妈蛋看毛线啊。 随便拉一段出来： It may, for example, have to put a penalty on the carrying of weapons rather than their use; on suspicious behavior rather than observed misdemeanors; on...
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These three books capture the key themes that have emerged in Western thinking about strategy since the end of World War II. By far the most important development was the start of the nuclear age. The advent of the atomic bomb demanded a reappraisal of mili...
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黄药师
华夏出版社2006版
静下心来
华夏出版社2006版
momo
华夏出版社2019版
5 有用 阿伯次得分高 2011-08-20 01:28:13
看着一本原以为是国际政治范畴的书突然出现了微分方程@@查了一下作者才知道是诺贝尔经济学奖得主。。。
3 有用 安蜡笔 2017-07-30 05:51:37
我觉得真的很有意思，这样的书的存在再次说明文理同源。就像数学学到最后会变成天体物理再回归哲学，动态博弈，在脱离了经济学理想模型的实际运用里与社会学是多么不谋而合。是有趣的灵感。
1 有用 小土刀 2016-07-21 06:35:00
重点是要别人相信，其实还是一个『欺骗』问题
1 有用 一二三 2021-11-15 15:01:38
核弹威慑平衡不知道是不是来自这本书，书里很多观点都很有意思，让人辩证看待问题，比如让自己陷入更局限的条件反而有利于谈判，比如军备竞赛有利于维持和平，比如其他人的博弈论研究理性和逻辑，而谢林说心理反应何尝不是一种逻辑。最有价值的观点大概是政策并非铁板一块，在制定和执行中存在太多不确定性，我们的未来充满猜忌、试探和运气，是一个不确定的世界。后半部分主要是当年冷战格局下作者的对美苏博弈的探讨，草草翻完。
0 有用 鹿鹿小姐姐 2021-11-16 10:23:31
还以为讲的是现实生活如何处理冲突的书，结果看下来讲的是如何处理美苏冷战及政治冲突应对策略的书。是我格局小了。
0 有用 酷酷功仔 2022-08-14 13:40:11
The power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself. In bargaining, weakness is often strength. To burn bridges behind one may suffice to undo an opponent.
0 有用 鹿鹿小姐姐 2021-11-16 10:23:31
还以为讲的是现实生活如何处理冲突的书，结果看下来讲的是如何处理美苏冷战及政治冲突应对策略的书。是我格局小了。
1 有用 一二三 2021-11-15 15:01:38
核弹威慑平衡不知道是不是来自这本书，书里很多观点都很有意思，让人辩证看待问题，比如让自己陷入更局限的条件反而有利于谈判，比如军备竞赛有利于维持和平，比如其他人的博弈论研究理性和逻辑，而谢林说心理反应何尝不是一种逻辑。最有价值的观点大概是政策并非铁板一块，在制定和执行中存在太多不确定性，我们的未来充满猜忌、试探和运气，是一个不确定的世界。后半部分主要是当年冷战格局下作者的对美苏博弈的探讨，草草翻完。
2 有用 MeltingRouge 2020-12-17 21:54:38
不错 突然明白为什么翻译能翻那么烂了 真的不容易
0 有用 立群 2018-03-21 12:51:54
毫无疑问，谢林深入浅出的文字并不是给不具备思辨能力的人阅读的。