出版社: The MIT Press
出版年: 2004-12-10
页数: 744
定价: USD 78.00
装帧: Hardcover
ISBN: 9780262025768
内容简介 · · · · · ·
Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organiz...
Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
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合同理论的发展三阶段
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The reasoning is similar with the JSAC 11 paper. Lin Gao et.al "Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Ratio Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Modeling Approach", in IEEE JSAC, 2011. If the buyer's utility satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition: \begin{equation*} \frac{\partial}{\partial\theta}\left[-\frac{\partial u/\partial q}{\partial u /\partial T}\right]>0 \end{equation*}
2012-05-23 17:15
The reasoning is similar with the JSAC 11 paper. Lin Gao et.al "Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Ratio Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Modeling Approach", in IEEE JSAC, 2011. If the buyer's utility satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition:
\begin{equation*} \frac{\partial}{\partial\theta}\left[-\frac{\partial u/\partial q}{\partial u /\partial T}\right]>0 \end{equation*}回应 2012-05-23 17:15 -
Optimal contract under perfect information: For a contract ($(q, T)$), where ($q$) is the number of units purchased, ($T$) is the total amount paid to the seller. The utility for a buyer: ($u(q, T, \theta)=\theta v(q)-T$), in which ($\theta$) is the type of the buyer. Note that ($v(q)$) should satisfy the following condition: \begin{eqnarray*} v'(q)&>&0 \\ v''(q)&<0& \end{...
2012-05-23 16:46
Optimal contract under perfect information: For a contract ($(q, T)$), where ($q$) is the number of units purchased, ($T$) is the total amount paid to the seller. The utility for a buyer: ($u(q, T, \theta)=\theta v(q)-T$), in which ($\theta$) is the type of the buyer. Note that ($v(q)$) should satisfy the following condition:
\begin{eqnarray*} v'(q)&>&0 \\ v''(q)&<0& \end{eqnarray*}In another word, ($v(q)$) is concave. The utility for a seller for selling a contract ($(q, T)$): ($\pi=T-cq$), in which ($c$) is the seller's unit production cost. Suppose the utility without choosing any contract is ($\bar{u}$) for a buyer. With perfect information, the optimal contract design is transformed to the following optimization problem:
\begin{eqnarray*} \max_{T_i, q_i}&\quad&T_i-cq_i \\ \textrm{subject to}&\quad&\theta_iv(q_i)-T_i\geq \bar{u} \end{eqnarray*}The solution ($(\tilde{q_i}, \tilde{T_i})$) is that:
\begin{eqnarray*} \theta_iv'(\tilde{q_i})&=&c\\ \theta_iv(\tilde{q_i})&=&\tilde{T_i}+\bar{u} \end{eqnarray*}The first equation can be obtained by take the first order derivative on ($T_i-cq_i$).
回应 2012-05-23 16:46
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Optimal contract under perfect information: For a contract ($(q, T)$), where ($q$) is the number of units purchased, ($T$) is the total amount paid to the seller. The utility for a buyer: ($u(q, T, \theta)=\theta v(q)-T$), in which ($\theta$) is the type of the buyer. Note that ($v(q)$) should satisfy the following condition: \begin{eqnarray*} v'(q)&>&0 \\ v''(q)&<0& \end{...
2012-05-23 16:46
Optimal contract under perfect information: For a contract ($(q, T)$), where ($q$) is the number of units purchased, ($T$) is the total amount paid to the seller. The utility for a buyer: ($u(q, T, \theta)=\theta v(q)-T$), in which ($\theta$) is the type of the buyer. Note that ($v(q)$) should satisfy the following condition:
\begin{eqnarray*} v'(q)&>&0 \\ v''(q)&<0& \end{eqnarray*}In another word, ($v(q)$) is concave. The utility for a seller for selling a contract ($(q, T)$): ($\pi=T-cq$), in which ($c$) is the seller's unit production cost. Suppose the utility without choosing any contract is ($\bar{u}$) for a buyer. With perfect information, the optimal contract design is transformed to the following optimization problem:
\begin{eqnarray*} \max_{T_i, q_i}&\quad&T_i-cq_i \\ \textrm{subject to}&\quad&\theta_iv(q_i)-T_i\geq \bar{u} \end{eqnarray*}The solution ($(\tilde{q_i}, \tilde{T_i})$) is that:
\begin{eqnarray*} \theta_iv'(\tilde{q_i})&=&c\\ \theta_iv(\tilde{q_i})&=&\tilde{T_i}+\bar{u} \end{eqnarray*}The first equation can be obtained by take the first order derivative on ($T_i-cq_i$).
回应 2012-05-23 16:46 -
The reasoning is similar with the JSAC 11 paper. Lin Gao et.al "Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Ratio Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Modeling Approach", in IEEE JSAC, 2011. If the buyer's utility satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition: \begin{equation*} \frac{\partial}{\partial\theta}\left[-\frac{\partial u/\partial q}{\partial u /\partial T}\right]>0 \end{equation*}
2012-05-23 17:15
The reasoning is similar with the JSAC 11 paper. Lin Gao et.al "Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Ratio Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Modeling Approach", in IEEE JSAC, 2011. If the buyer's utility satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition:
\begin{equation*} \frac{\partial}{\partial\theta}\left[-\frac{\partial u/\partial q}{\partial u /\partial T}\right]>0 \end{equation*}回应 2012-05-23 17:15
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The reasoning is similar with the JSAC 11 paper. Lin Gao et.al "Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Ratio Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Modeling Approach", in IEEE JSAC, 2011. If the buyer's utility satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition: \begin{equation*} \frac{\partial}{\partial\theta}\left[-\frac{\partial u/\partial q}{\partial u /\partial T}\right]>0 \end{equation*}
2012-05-23 17:15
The reasoning is similar with the JSAC 11 paper. Lin Gao et.al "Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Ratio Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Modeling Approach", in IEEE JSAC, 2011. If the buyer's utility satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition:
\begin{equation*} \frac{\partial}{\partial\theta}\left[-\frac{\partial u/\partial q}{\partial u /\partial T}\right]>0 \end{equation*}回应 2012-05-23 17:15 -
Optimal contract under perfect information: For a contract ($(q, T)$), where ($q$) is the number of units purchased, ($T$) is the total amount paid to the seller. The utility for a buyer: ($u(q, T, \theta)=\theta v(q)-T$), in which ($\theta$) is the type of the buyer. Note that ($v(q)$) should satisfy the following condition: \begin{eqnarray*} v'(q)&>&0 \\ v''(q)&<0& \end{...
2012-05-23 16:46
Optimal contract under perfect information: For a contract ($(q, T)$), where ($q$) is the number of units purchased, ($T$) is the total amount paid to the seller. The utility for a buyer: ($u(q, T, \theta)=\theta v(q)-T$), in which ($\theta$) is the type of the buyer. Note that ($v(q)$) should satisfy the following condition:
\begin{eqnarray*} v'(q)&>&0 \\ v''(q)&<0& \end{eqnarray*}In another word, ($v(q)$) is concave. The utility for a seller for selling a contract ($(q, T)$): ($\pi=T-cq$), in which ($c$) is the seller's unit production cost. Suppose the utility without choosing any contract is ($\bar{u}$) for a buyer. With perfect information, the optimal contract design is transformed to the following optimization problem:
\begin{eqnarray*} \max_{T_i, q_i}&\quad&T_i-cq_i \\ \textrm{subject to}&\quad&\theta_iv(q_i)-T_i\geq \bar{u} \end{eqnarray*}The solution ($(\tilde{q_i}, \tilde{T_i})$) is that:
\begin{eqnarray*} \theta_iv'(\tilde{q_i})&=&c\\ \theta_iv(\tilde{q_i})&=&\tilde{T_i}+\bar{u} \end{eqnarray*}The first equation can be obtained by take the first order derivative on ($T_i-cq_i$).
回应 2012-05-23 16:46
论坛 · · · · · ·
这书写的真是粗糙啊...... | 来自focout | 4 回应 | 2012-10-07 |
MIT 合同理论的主要用书 | 来自softair | 2008-02-22 | |
书不错,就是作者语言很奇怪 | 来自豆瓣用户 | 2007-12-03 |
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订阅关于Contract Theory的评论:
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1 有用 立群 2018-10-29
三个月时间 终于过了一遍
0 有用 [已注销] 2012-07-27
本书全面介绍了合同理论的研究历史和现状,相当于一个比较全面的survey,作者本人应该是该领域的大佬,80年代就有paper推动过该领域的发展。由于自己最近的研究需要用到一些相关的内容,主要看了第二和第九章。2012.05.22-2012.07.27。
0 有用 萝卜头 2009-04-10
自己去别人那印的,算盗版吧,看了第一章introduction,准备看完的,不过知道有没有时间了
0 有用 Q.E.D. 2018-11-15
不完全契约章节对GHM模型解释得比较到位了,还包括可观察不可验证信息下的Nash实施,算是最出彩的部分。前面的Screen,也真是手把手教,比较赞!
0 有用 W 2016-10-01
根据需要读了一二三五章。
0 有用 Quasi 2020-02-20
我这种zz配不上这本书。
0 有用 [已注销] 2018-11-23
Chp2 4 6考试要考。。。
0 有用 Q.E.D. 2018-11-15
不完全契约章节对GHM模型解释得比较到位了,还包括可观察不可验证信息下的Nash实施,算是最出彩的部分。前面的Screen,也真是手把手教,比较赞!
1 有用 立群 2018-10-29
三个月时间 终于过了一遍
0 有用 W 2016-10-01
根据需要读了一二三五章。