The fox knows many things, the Greeks said, but the hedgehog knows one big thing. In his most comprehensive work, Ronald Dworkin argues that value in all its forms is one big thing: that what truth is, life means, morality requires, and justice demands are different aspects of the same large question. He develops original theories on a great variety of issues very rarely consid...
The fox knows many things, the Greeks said, but the hedgehog knows one big thing. In his most comprehensive work, Ronald Dworkin argues that value in all its forms is one big thing: that what truth is, life means, morality requires, and justice demands are different aspects of the same large question. He develops original theories on a great variety of issues very rarely considered in the same book: moral skepticism, literary, artistic, and historical interpretation, free will, ancient moral theory, being good and living well, liberty, equality, and law among many other topics. What we think about any one of these must stand up, eventually, to any argument we find compelling about the rest. Skepticism in all its forms - philosophical, cynical, or post-modern - threatens that unity. The Galilean revolution once made the theological world of value safe for science. But the new republic gradually became a new empire: the modern philosophers inflated the methods of physics into a totalitarian theory of everything. They invaded and occupied all the honorifics - reality, truth, fact, ground, meaning, knowledge, and being - and dictated the terms on which other bodies of thought might aspire to them, and skepticism has been the inevitable result. We need a new revolution. We must make the world of science safe for value.
Some speech-act skeptics insist that the close connection between moral judgments and motives I mentioned earlier shows that moral judgments cannot be beliefs, and so cannot be true or false, because beliefs cannot provide motives by themselves. I may believe that aspirin will relieve my pain, but it doesn’t follow that I am in any way inclined to take aspirin. I will feel that urge only if I have an in dependent desire that my pain cease. So if moral judgments do provide motives by themselves, they cannot be beliefs. We need a second act in which we declare them just emotional outbursts or declarations of some desire or plan; it is the emotion or desire or plan that supplies the near-automatic motivation we find.
This simple-sounding argument hides a great variety of complexities, refinem... (查看原文)
理一分殊
中国政法大学出版社2016版
hanibar
中国政法大学出版社2016版
还没人写过短评呢