The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not.The...
The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not.The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.
作者简介
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Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is Professor of Politics at New York University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Alastair Smith is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University.
Randolph M. Siverson is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Davis.
James D. Morrow is Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scie...
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is Professor of Politics at New York University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Alastair Smith is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University.
Randolph M. Siverson is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Davis.
James D. Morrow is Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the University of Michigan.
目录
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Preface
I A THEORY OF POLITICAL INCENTIVES
1 Reigning in the Prince
Three Puzzles
The Essence of the Argument
Organization of the Investigation
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Preface
I A THEORY OF POLITICAL INCENTIVES
1 Reigning in the Prince
Three Puzzles
The Essence of the Argument
Organization of the Investigation
A Theory of Political Incentives: Part I
Policy Choice and Political Survival: Part II
Choosing Institutions for Political Selection: Part III
Why Focus on Political Survival?
Threats to Political Survival
Challenges to Political Survival
Easy Answers, Inadequate Answers
An Incomplete Theory of Institutional Political Laws
2 The Theory: Definitions and Intuition
The Elements of the Polity
The Selectorate (S)
The Winning Coalition (W)
Illustrative Examples of Small, Restrictive Winning Coalitions
Sources of Risks and Rewards
The Challenger’s Commitment Problem
Affinity
The Replacement or Deposition Rule
Political Systems: Analogies But Not Equivalence
What Is Missing from Our Theory
Conclusion
3 A Model of the Selectorate Theory
Economic Activity, Policy Provision, and Payoffs
Equilibria of the Selectorate Model
Alternative Equilibrium
How Institutions Structure Incentives
Further Implications
Bridging from Theory to Testable Hypotheses
Conclusion
Appendix
II POLICY CHOICE AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL
4 Institutions for Kleptocracy or Growth
Measurement Issues
Institutional Variables
Measurement of Labor, Leisure, and Taxes
Evidence: Labor or Leisure
Evidence: Taxation
Economic Growth
Government Expenditures, Expenditures Per Capita and Opportunities for Kleptocracy
Conclusion
5 Institutions, Peace, and Prosperity
The Shift from Public to Private Goods in Sparta
Empirical Assessments: Core Public Goods
General Public Goods
Public Goods Summary
Empirical Assessment of the Provision of Private Goods
Montesquieu, Madison, Population, and Public Welfare
Leopold II: An Illustration
Conclusion
6 War, Peace, and Coalition Size
The Democratic Peace
The Debate
The Dyadic Selectorate Model
Structure of the Dyadic Selectorate Game
Solving the Game
The Decision to Fight or to Negotiate
The Selectorate Peace: Interaction of Polities
Diversionary War and Compromise Agreements
Empirical Assessments
Conclusion
Appendix
7 Political Survival
Survival as Explained by the Selectorate Theory
Mamluk Egypt
Empirical Assessment of Political Survival
Extrapolitical Risks of Deposition
A Tale of Two Countries
Conclusion
III CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
8 Institutional Preferences: Change from Within
The Selectorate Theory and Institutional Preferences
Oppression
Political Actions to Alter Institutions
Population Migration: The Disenfranchised and the Selectorate
Protest, Civil War, and Revolution
Purges and Coups d’état: Actions by CoalitionMembers
Actions by Leaders: Constructing Autocracy
Conclusion
9 The Enemy Outside and Within: War and Changes of Leadersand Regimes
Selection Institutions and War Aims
The Anglo-Soviet Invasion of Iran
Testing the War Aims Argument
Leadership Removal
War and Domestic Change
Nation Building After Disputes
Franco, Mussolini, and the Enemy Within
Conclusion
Appendix
10 Promoting Peace and Prosperity
The Hobbes Index
Explaining the Hobbes Index
What Can Be Done?
Conclusion
Notes
References
Index
· · · · · · (收起)
Leaders make three related sets of decisions. First, they choose a tax rate that generates government revenue and that influences how hard people work. Second, they spend the revenue raised in a manner designed to help keep incumbents in office, particularly by sustaining support among members of their winning coalition. Finally, they provide various mixes of public and private goods. Private benefits are distributed only to members of the winning coalition and diminish in value to individual coalition members as the size of the group expands. Consequently, as the size of the coalition increases, leaders are expected to shift their effort to the provision of public goods that benefit all in society. (查看原文)
We take as axiomatic that everyone in a position of authority wants to keep that authority and that it is the maneuvering to do so that is central to politics in any type of regime. When we say it is central, we mean that all actions taken by political leaders are intended by them to be compatible with their desire to retain power (Downs 1957; Black 1958; Wintrobe 1998). (查看原文)
0 有用 catteforry 2024-04-06 13:13:15 辽宁
作者的致胜联盟模型有很大的启发性，我认为对不同zz阶层的互动还可以有所补充。 如果说leaders因为q力的淘汰机制而有类似的行为模式，那么作者恐怕把leaders以外的人想得过于“理性人”。 作者采用大量数据进行回归分析，但数据的编制与解读仍然不可能避免研究者的主观成分。 学会了一个词，cannon fodder。