The Concept of Mind

First published in 1949 Gilbert Ryle's "The Concept of Mind" is one of the classics of Twentieth-Century philosophy, influential and controversial in equal measure. Described by Ryle himself as a 'sustained piece of analytical hatchet-work' on Cartesian dualism, "The Concept of Mind" is a radical attempt to jettison once and for what Ryle called 'the ghost in the machine': Descartes' argument that mind and body are two separate entities. Ryle argues that the language traditionally used to describe the relationship between mind and body amounts to nothing less than a massive 'category mistake'. Terms such as 'mind', 'thought' and 'belief' do not refer to a mysterious, inner world but simply describe certain actions and our ability to perform them. Even the act of imagining, argues Ryle, should be understood as an outward rather than inner performance, as when we watch a boxer shadow-boxing an imaginary opponent before entering the ring. On this basis, Ryle overturns some long-held assumptions about language and knowledge, including knowledge of other people's minds and launched the new movement of philosophical behaviourism. Ryle builds his case via an erudite and beautifully written account of the will, emotion, self-knowledge, sensation and observation, imagination and the intellect. Some of the problems he tackles, such as the distinction between 'knowing how and knowing that', challenged some of the bedrock assumptions of philosophy and continue to exert important influence on contemporary philosophy. A classic work of philosophy and psychology "The Concept of Mind" is essential reading for anyone interested in the nature of the mind and human behaviour. This Sixtieth Anniversary edition includes a substantial commentary by Julia Tanney.