This is the most important book on Hegel to have appeared in the past ten years. Robert Pippin offers a completely new interpretation of Hegel's idealism, which focuses on Hegel's appropriation and development of kant's theoretical project. Hegel is presented neither as a precritical metaphysician nor as a social theorist, but as a critical philosopher whose disagreements with ...
This is the most important book on Hegel to have appeared in the past ten years. Robert Pippin offers a completely new interpretation of Hegel's idealism, which focuses on Hegel's appropriation and development of kant's theoretical project. Hegel is presented neither as a precritical metaphysician nor as a social theorist, but as a critical philosopher whose disagreements with Kant, especially on the issue of intuitions, enrich the idealist arguments against empiricism, realism and naturalism. In the face of the dismissal of absolute idealism as either unintelligible or implausible, Pippin explains and defends an original account of the philosophical basis for Hegel's claims about the historical and social nature of selfconsciousness, and so of knowledge itself.
He will try to show, determinately, why, given some putative Notional determination of objects, doubts about whether objects must or even can be so Notionally specified, are the relevant, determinate doubts they are, only as a consequence of that Notion's own incompleteness. (查看原文)
The claim is that an object must itself be capable of exhibiting a property complexity in experience in order for there to be the mediated taking-to-be-true necessary for any perceptual intending. Although it is logically possible that no object exhibits such complexity, ever, in any experience, to entertain that possibility would also be to claim that consciousness cannot ever relate itself to and distinguish itself from an object at all. And Hegel clearly believes that he has established that there is no good reason for taking such a possibility as a serious skeptical threat. To the extent that such a possibility could be conceived as an experience, Hegel has already shown its self-refuting difficulties. (查看原文)
罗伯特·皮平 作者
5 有用 后 2016-01-01 22:44:02
缓慢的推进，大师作为匠人之作，此书比国内最好的同类作品还要好的要素应该是语言吧。英语比起汉语更易把术语结晶化，再在日常语言中有节制的扩散，更易显得是研究哲学而非研究哲学家。
1 有用 又落 2016-10-20 02:37:04
呕心力作。
0 有用 淮王旧鸡犬 2022-03-16 09:19:46
补标，极好的入门，高多周目价值
1 有用 陈直 2021-11-05 18:26:16
读过其中译版《黑格尔的观念论》。最近注意到作者Robert Pippin是因为他还是一位尼采专家，真正有真正学问的学者。
0 有用 Wittgel 2024-03-11 18:57:03 北京
太康
0 有用 Wittgel 2024-03-11 18:57:03 北京
太康
0 有用 𝐇 2023-03-15 21:06:32 北京
本质上是hegels transcendental idealism，虽然我向来不同意任何非形而上学解释（它们统统都太过取巧），不过也必须承认Pippin的确拔高了这类解释的精细程度——而且好看。由于作者认为黑格尔的问题域和康德没有任何区别，所以挺方便熟悉康德的读者进入，换个角度说，也能帮助我们尽可能地发掘黑格尔中隐秘的康德主义。// 摘两段：“精神现象学···说明，各种精神形态或各种概念，如何以... 本质上是hegels transcendental idealism，虽然我向来不同意任何非形而上学解释（它们统统都太过取巧），不过也必须承认Pippin的确拔高了这类解释的精细程度——而且好看。由于作者认为黑格尔的问题域和康德没有任何区别，所以挺方便熟悉康德的读者进入，换个角度说，也能帮助我们尽可能地发掘黑格尔中隐秘的康德主义。// 摘两段：“精神现象学···说明，各种精神形态或各种概念，如何以及为什么逐渐被经验为根本的、因而在某种程度上被思考为经验之可能性的构成部分所以不能为经验所修正。”（93）“黑格尔从主体和客体的同一出发来讨论康德的‘综合的最高原则’，这真的是在重述康德的目标。‘经验的可能性条件同时是经验对象的可能性条件’这句话中的‘是’，可以被解读为一种同一性主张。”（80） (展开)
0 有用 淮王旧鸡犬 2022-03-16 09:19:46
补标，极好的入门，高多周目价值
1 有用 陈直 2021-11-05 18:26:16
读过其中译版《黑格尔的观念论》。最近注意到作者Robert Pippin是因为他还是一位尼采专家，真正有真正学问的学者。
1 有用 浅中 2021-03-16 17:51:15
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