The much-discussed book that explores how cooperation can emerge in a world of self-seeking egoists--whether superpowers, businesses, or individuals--when there is no central authority to police their actions.
尽管事实上任何改善“一报还一报”的企图都没有奏效，单还是可以容易地找到这次竞赛的条件下能比“一报还一报”表现得更好的几个规则。这些规则的存在可以给轻信“以牙还牙”肯定是最好的策略的人一个警告。至少有三个规则如果参赛的话将赢得竞赛。
这个简单的程序只有在对方前两步连续背叛后才背叛。它是“一报还一报”的更加宽容的版本，它从不惩罚孤立的背叛。这个“两报还一报”(TIT FOR TWO TATS)规则的出色表现揭示了参赛者的一个共同错误，即预期相对于“一报还一报”更少点宽容能得到更多好处。然而，事实上，更多的宽容才能得到更多好处。这个惊人的发现表明，即使是战略专家也没有给宽容的重要性以足够的重视。
以上补充规则的分析结果支持了从分析参赛规则本身所得到的观点：即参赛者为了自己的利益太富于竞争性。首先，许多人在游戏中没有受到挑衅就早早地开始背叛，这个特点从长远看来是要付出大代价的。其次，任何参赛者所显示出来的宽容性比理想的要小得多（“唐宁"可能是例外）。第三，最与众不同的规则”唐宁“，由于对其他人的反应所作的初始假设太悲观而做了不少蠢事。
检验者是由戴维·格拉德斯坦提交的，在竞赛中名列46名。它被设计成专门欺负软骨头。但是一旦对方表示出不可欺负性，它就罢手。这个规则的不寻常之处是为了检验对方的反应，它在第一步就背叛，如果对方背叛，它就赶快抱歉，回之以合作，然后在其余步中采用”一报还一报“ 。如果对方步反应它的第一步背叛，它就在第二步和第三步合作，但是在而后的步中它就每隔一步背叛一次。“检验者”在那几个在第一轮竞赛中可能取胜的补充规则对局时占了不少便宜。......实际上如果它们像“一报还一报”及那些名列前茅的程序那样在第二步就立即用背叛反击“检验者”的话，它们的处境就会好很多。这可以使得“检验者”赶快抱歉，而后的情况就好多了。 (查看原文)
In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, you benefit from the other player’s cooperation. The trick is to encourage that cooperation. The other player should not be regarded as someone who is out to defeat...In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, you benefit from the other player’s cooperation. The trick is to encourage that cooperation. The other player should not be regarded as someone who is out to defeat you.(展开)
In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, you benefit from the other player’s cooperation. The trick is to encourage that cooperation. The other player should not be regarded as someone who is out to defeat...In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, you benefit from the other player’s cooperation. The trick is to encourage that cooperation. The other player should not be regarded as someone who is out to defeat you.(展开)
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罗伯特·阿克塞尔罗德 作者
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0 有用 装睡的人 2018-02-20 06:42:33
挺好玩的。虽然书的结论和大家的日常直觉差不多（即使那个试验似乎也暗示除了Rapoport之外很多专家的直觉未必靠谱），但更有意思的是，即使这些合作的条件与策略明明很直觉且乍一看对每个人都有利，为什么合作依然常常达不成。
0 有用 酷酷功仔 2022-07-30 09:16:02
In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, you benefit from the other player’s cooperation. The trick is to encourage that cooperation. The other player should not be regarded as someone who is out to defeat... In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, you benefit from the other player’s cooperation. The trick is to encourage that cooperation. The other player should not be regarded as someone who is out to defeat you. (展开)
0 有用 酷酷功仔 2022-07-30 09:16:02
In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, you benefit from the other player’s cooperation. The trick is to encourage that cooperation. The other player should not be regarded as someone who is out to defeat... In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, you benefit from the other player’s cooperation. The trick is to encourage that cooperation. The other player should not be regarded as someone who is out to defeat you. (展开)
0 有用 装睡的人 2018-02-20 06:42:33
挺好玩的。虽然书的结论和大家的日常直觉差不多（即使那个试验似乎也暗示除了Rapoport之外很多专家的直觉未必靠谱），但更有意思的是，即使这些合作的条件与策略明明很直觉且乍一看对每个人都有利，为什么合作依然常常达不成。