Name: Philosophical Investigations
ISBN: 9780631231271

作者: Ludwig Wittgenstein
出版社: Wiley-Blackwell
副标题: The German Text, with a Revised English Translation 50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition
出版年: 2001
页数: 246
定价: GBP 19.99
装帧: Hardcover
ISBN: 9780631231271

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Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations presents his own distillation of two decades of intense work on the philosophies of mind, language and meaning. When first published in 1953, it immediately entered the centre of philosophical debate, and achieved a classic status it has retained ever since.

This revised German–English edition is published o...

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”可靠的根據是來自看來可靠的根據。“ ”通過經驗論證，這是有盡頭的。若沒個盡頭，它就不是論證了。“ (查看原文)

[已註銷] 4赞 2012-04-08 17:42:07

—— 引自第161页
“命令與執行之間有一道鴻溝，它必須由理解填平。” “只有通過理解，這個命令才叫做：我們必須做這個。命令－－那不過是些聲音，是些墨水道道罷了。” (查看原文)

[已註銷] 1 回复 1赞 2012-04-08 17:36:27

—— 引自第150页

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哲学 Wittgenstein 维特根斯坦语言哲学 philosophy 经典分析哲学 Philosophy

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木朵 2005-10-07 20:15:16 上海人民出版社2005版

红玫瑰与黑玫瑰

这篇书评可能有关键情节透露

如果是维特根斯坦问你，“红玫瑰在黑暗中是什么颜色？”请不要急于回复，因为这个问题可能蕴含了所有哲学问题。他提醒我们注意：“有的事情别人不问时我们明白，一旦要我们解释它我们就不明白了；而这正是我们必须留心思索的东西。”当你回答“还是红色”时，他会接着问：这是... (展开)

154

19 38回应

Atreus 2010-05-01 03:00:15 上海人民出版社2005版

沉默和微笑

1.维特根斯坦曾经举过这样的例子：当我移动一颗棋子的时候，“移动”这一动作本身是无意义的。而使得它有意义的是：象棋的规则与我对象棋规则的理解。 2.他举这个例子的目地在于说明：如果离开了使用与使用的规则，那么语言就会失去它的意义。对于他来说，语言的意义取决于使... (展开)

1 6回应

舞池里的塔西佗 2010-04-27 21:47:28 商务印书馆2000版

迷宫里的人——浅论<哲学研究>

维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》里自认为解决了哲学的根本问题，他明确地提出了哲学研究的目标“想要为思想划一个界限，或者毋宁说，不是为思想而是为思想的表达划一个界限”，并且得出结论“对于不可说的东西我们必须保持沉默”。《逻辑哲学论》以一种具有逻辑形式感的编码排列论... (展开)

7回应

[已注销] 2015-02-27 21:25:37 北京大学出版社2012版

维特根斯坦与世界观

一 “世界观”（Weltanshauung）这个词在维特根斯坦的著作中并不常见，在《逻辑哲学论》与《哲学研究》中仅各出现过一处。第一处是《逻辑哲学论》6.371：整个现代的世界观都建立在一种幻觉的基础上，即认为所谓的自然律是自然现象的解释。第二处是《哲学研究》122节：我... (展开)

5 3回应

Yurii 2007-01-11 16:52:18 上海人民出版社2005版

于混乱间见精巧

生活中总是充满各种各样的迷执(myth)，不去细细思考的话，很容易就被它们俘虏了：一棵树，作为一棵树的价值是几万元，做一次性筷子只值几十块（可是谁想过，几万元的受益者，和几十块的受益者，是截然不同的）。中国老太太先攒钱再还贷，美国老太太先买房后还贷（谁想过贷款... (展开)

5 2回应

Darklight 2010-01-23 19:31:43 上海人民出版社2005版

思想的魅力

一般大家都把维氏看作分析哲学一派，这样说也不错，但我倒觉得他与现象学有很多相像的地方，现象学发展成解释学也说明他们最后的归宿也在语言上，其实，“语言学转向”是由分析哲学和大陆现象学共同开启的，两相比较，或可大有收获。这本书若纯看做一本分析哲学的... (展开)

1 5回应

姬一鸥 2009-11-28 11:09:45

[zz]冯·赖特教授所写的维氏传略选摘

　路德维希·维特根斯坦是现代西方哲学中的有影响的哲学家，以其早期著作《逻辑哲学论》和后期著作《哲学研究》而著称。他的哲学思想，给现代分析哲学中的两个主要流派逻辑经验主义和日常语言哲学以很大影响。对于他的生平，人们所知甚少。将由商务印书馆出版的《回忆维特根斯... (展开)

3 2回应

时间的玫瑰 2015-07-15 18:03:19 上海人民出版社2005版

转：周濂《站在思想的高墙上》（《你永远无法叫醒一个装睡的人》）

（发表于《南方周末》“副刊/秘密书架”（2011年5月26日）。发表时被编辑直接改名为《周濂的书单》。其实只是我的秘密书架，与个人的学术经历有关，所列书目绝没有囊括我所认为的好书。）周濂我至今仍在四处宣称，当年选择报考哲学系，不是因为高中政治学的好，而是因为我... (展开)

1回应

江绪林 2015-03-13 20:06:57 上海人民出版社2005版

Wittgenstein《哲学研究（1953）》小摘要

【按语：通读了一遍，但基本上只对前60页有感：后面很多内容是维氏零乱的思考，虽然可以理解为对作为生活形式的语言现象的具体分析，但仍缺乏像前面部分那样的聚焦的主题或者回答前面的论点所导致的某些亟待回答的问题（当然，也或许是我没太搞懂。）《哲学研究》可看做是对《... (展开)

2 0回应

溯溪 2016-07-06 16:35:08 上海人民出版社2005版

维特根斯坦的语言游戏与感觉

如果说《论语》的篇章结构零散，只言片语，不成严密的体系，那么维特根斯坦的《哲学研究》也算是一本可与《论语》在结构上媲美的经典著作。《哲学研究》一书形式更为独特，它不像《论语》那样分篇章、取有章节名（学者们对《论语》各章节间是否有逻辑关系存在较大的争议，部分... (展开)

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第18页 43

貪瞋痴の徒然 (夕惕若厉，终日乾乾。)

For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. At this time, Wittgenstein is trying to provide a definition to 'meaning'; and his 'meaning' is very close to the 'referent' in my previous comment. Crucial ...
2015-07-09 10:13

For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.
引自 43
At this time, Wittgenstein is trying to provide a definition to 'meaning'; and his 'meaning' is very close to the 'referent' in my previous comment. Crucial thing here is that he is distinguishing 'meaning' and 'bearer'. People in language-games are talking about 'meaning' rather than 'bearers'. Note that Wittgenstein is using the notion 'langauge' to define the notion 'meaning' as if 'language' is a free concept that does not need to be defined. If a language is defined somewhat as chunks of systematic meaningful sounds or the like, then Wittgenstein's point will fall apart since in the definition of language, the notion 'meaning', which is defined by 'language' in his theory, is employed.

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回应 2015-07-09 10:13
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第17页 39

貪瞋痴の徒然 (夕惕若厉，终日乾乾。)

It is not the item itself, but rather the referent that corresponds to a word. Referent is metaphysical and is not going to be obsolete or broken even if the item is physically broken or destroyed. This is true to any langauge-game. And when we are talking about something, we are not really talking about it per se; rather we are talking about the notion, the idea, the sense. Specificity is a li...
2015-07-09 09:59

It is not the item itself, but rather the referent that corresponds to a word. Referent is metaphysical and is not going to be obsolete or broken even if the item is physically broken or destroyed. This is true to any langauge-game. And when we are talking about something, we are not really talking about it per se; rather we are talking about the notion, the idea, the sense. Specificity is a linguistic notion; however specified in actual language, a referent is a referent and is not the actual item. Wittgenstein is, up till now, not noting this very important difference between item and referent. One may also argue that even if a difference between referent and item is made, such a theory need also explain how the two notions, referent and item, are connected. This might be a problem that falls beyond the realm of linguistic study. Or at least, it is more philosophical than it is linguistic.

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回应 2015-07-09 09:59
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第38页

PhotoniKaka

I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? ——"So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". ——But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to dis...
2015-06-14 09:04

I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? ——"So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". ——But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you rules ready for such cases—rules saying whether one may use the word "chair" to include this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word "chair"; and are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?

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回应 2015-06-14 09:04
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第16页 Part I

[已注销]

...This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.--And you really get such a queer connexion when a philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems ...
2015-05-25 14:35

...This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.--And you really get such a queer connexion when a philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And here we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism of an object. And we can also say word "this" to the object, as it were address the object as "this"--a queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy...
引自 Part I

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回应 2015-05-25 14:35

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第16页 Part I

[已注销]

...This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.--And you really get such a queer connexion when a philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems ...
2015-05-25 14:35

...This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.--And you really get such a queer connexion when a philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And here we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism of an object. And we can also say word "this" to the object, as it were address the object as "this"--a queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy...
引自 Part I

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回应 2015-05-25 14:35
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第17页 39

貪瞋痴の徒然 (夕惕若厉，终日乾乾。)

It is not the item itself, but rather the referent that corresponds to a word. Referent is metaphysical and is not going to be obsolete or broken even if the item is physically broken or destroyed. This is true to any langauge-game. And when we are talking about something, we are not really talking about it per se; rather we are talking about the notion, the idea, the sense. Specificity is a li...
2015-07-09 09:59

It is not the item itself, but rather the referent that corresponds to a word. Referent is metaphysical and is not going to be obsolete or broken even if the item is physically broken or destroyed. This is true to any langauge-game. And when we are talking about something, we are not really talking about it per se; rather we are talking about the notion, the idea, the sense. Specificity is a linguistic notion; however specified in actual language, a referent is a referent and is not the actual item. Wittgenstein is, up till now, not noting this very important difference between item and referent. One may also argue that even if a difference between referent and item is made, such a theory need also explain how the two notions, referent and item, are connected. This might be a problem that falls beyond the realm of linguistic study. Or at least, it is more philosophical than it is linguistic.

推荐

回应 2015-07-09 09:59
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第18页 43

貪瞋痴の徒然 (夕惕若厉，终日乾乾。)

For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. At this time, Wittgenstein is trying to provide a definition to 'meaning'; and his 'meaning' is very close to the 'referent' in my previous comment. Crucial ...
2015-07-09 10:13

For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.
引自 43
At this time, Wittgenstein is trying to provide a definition to 'meaning'; and his 'meaning' is very close to the 'referent' in my previous comment. Crucial thing here is that he is distinguishing 'meaning' and 'bearer'. People in language-games are talking about 'meaning' rather than 'bearers'. Note that Wittgenstein is using the notion 'langauge' to define the notion 'meaning' as if 'language' is a free concept that does not need to be defined. If a language is defined somewhat as chunks of systematic meaningful sounds or the like, then Wittgenstein's point will fall apart since in the definition of language, the notion 'meaning', which is defined by 'language' in his theory, is employed.

推荐

回应 2015-07-09 10:13
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第38页

PhotoniKaka

I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? ——"So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". ——But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to dis...
2015-06-14 09:04

I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? ——"So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". ——But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you rules ready for such cases—rules saying whether one may use the word "chair" to include this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word "chair"; and are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?

推荐

回应 2015-06-14 09:04

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第18页 43

貪瞋痴の徒然 (夕惕若厉，终日乾乾。)

For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. At this time, Wittgenstein is trying to provide a definition to 'meaning'; and his 'meaning' is very close to the 'referent' in my previous comment. Crucial ...
2015-07-09 10:13

For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.
引自 43
At this time, Wittgenstein is trying to provide a definition to 'meaning'; and his 'meaning' is very close to the 'referent' in my previous comment. Crucial thing here is that he is distinguishing 'meaning' and 'bearer'. People in language-games are talking about 'meaning' rather than 'bearers'. Note that Wittgenstein is using the notion 'langauge' to define the notion 'meaning' as if 'language' is a free concept that does not need to be defined. If a language is defined somewhat as chunks of systematic meaningful sounds or the like, then Wittgenstein's point will fall apart since in the definition of language, the notion 'meaning', which is defined by 'language' in his theory, is employed.

推荐

回应 2015-07-09 10:13
展开收起
第17页 39

貪瞋痴の徒然 (夕惕若厉，终日乾乾。)

It is not the item itself, but rather the referent that corresponds to a word. Referent is metaphysical and is not going to be obsolete or broken even if the item is physically broken or destroyed. This is true to any langauge-game. And when we are talking about something, we are not really talking about it per se; rather we are talking about the notion, the idea, the sense. Specificity is a li...
2015-07-09 09:59

It is not the item itself, but rather the referent that corresponds to a word. Referent is metaphysical and is not going to be obsolete or broken even if the item is physically broken or destroyed. This is true to any langauge-game. And when we are talking about something, we are not really talking about it per se; rather we are talking about the notion, the idea, the sense. Specificity is a linguistic notion; however specified in actual language, a referent is a referent and is not the actual item. Wittgenstein is, up till now, not noting this very important difference between item and referent. One may also argue that even if a difference between referent and item is made, such a theory need also explain how the two notions, referent and item, are connected. This might be a problem that falls beyond the realm of linguistic study. Or at least, it is more philosophical than it is linguistic.

推荐

回应 2015-07-09 09:59
展开收起
第38页

PhotoniKaka

I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? ——"So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". ——But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to dis...
2015-06-14 09:04

I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? ——"So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". ——But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you rules ready for such cases—rules saying whether one may use the word "chair" to include this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word "chair"; and are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?

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回应 2015-06-14 09:04
展开收起
第16页 Part I

[已注销]

...This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.--And you really get such a queer connexion when a philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems ...
2015-05-25 14:35

...This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.--And you really get such a queer connexion when a philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And here we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism of an object. And we can also say word "this" to the object, as it were address the object as "this"--a queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy...
引自 Part I

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回应 2015-05-25 14:35