Philosophical Investigations

For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

At this time, Wittgenstein is trying to provide a definition to 'meaning'; and his 'meaning' is very close to the 'referent' in my previous comment. Crucial thing here is that he is distinguishing 'meaning' and 'bearer'. People in language-games are talking about 'meaning' rather than 'bearers'.Note that Wittgenstein is using the notion 'langauge' to define the notion 'meaning' as if 'language' is a free concept that does not need to be defined. If a language is defined somewhat as chunks of systematic meaningful sounds or the like, then Wittgenstein's point will fall apart since in the definition of language, the notion 'meaning', which is defined by 'language' in his theory, is employed.

It is not the item itself, but rather the referent that corresponds to a word. Referent is metaphysical and is not going to be obsolete or broken even if the item is physically broken or destroyed. This is true to any langauge-game. And when we are talking about something, we are not really talking about it per se; rather we are talking about the notion, the idea, the sense. Specificity is a linguistic notion; however specified in actual language, a referent is a referent and is not the actual item. Wittgenstein is, up till now, not noting this very important difference between item and referent.One may also argue that even if a difference between referent and item is made, such a theory need also explain how the two notions, referent and item, are connected. This might be a problem that falls beyond the realm of linguistic study. Or at least, it is more philosophical than it is linguistic.

I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? ——"So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". ——But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you rules ready for such cases—rules saying whether one may use the word "chair" to include this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word "chair"; and are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?

...This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.--And you really get such a queer connexion when a philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And here we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism of an object. And we can also say word "this" to the object, as it were address the object as "this"--a queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy...