作者:
Ludwig Wittgenstein 出版社: Wiley-Blackwell 副标题: The German Text, with a Revised English Translation 50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition 出版年: 2001 页数: 246 定价: GBP 19.99 装帧: Hardcover ISBN: 9780631231271
Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations presents his own distillation of two decades of intense work on the philosophies of mind, language and meaning. When first published in 1953, it immediately entered the centre of philosophical debate, and achieved a classic status it has retained ever since.
This revised German–English edition is published o...
Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations presents his own distillation of two decades of intense work on the philosophies of mind, language and meaning. When first published in 1953, it immediately entered the centre of philosophical debate, and achieved a classic status it has retained ever since.
This revised German–English edition is published on the fiftieth anniversary of Wittgenstein's death. It incorporates final revisions by G. E. M. Anscombe (1919–2001) to her original English translation.
‘Stupidity consists in wanting to reach conclusions. We are a thread, and we want to know the whole cloth ... What mind worthy of the name, beginning with Homer, ever reached a conclusion? Let’s accep...‘Stupidity consists in wanting to reach conclusions. We are a thread, and we want to know the whole cloth ... What mind worthy of the name, beginning with Homer, ever reached a conclusion? Let’s accept the picture. That’s how things are. So be it ...’(展开)
For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. At this time, Wittgenstein is trying to provide a definition to 'meaning'; and his 'meaning' is very close to the 'referent' in my previous comment. Crucial ...
2015-07-09 10:13
For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.引自 43
At this time, Wittgenstein is trying to provide a definition to 'meaning'; and his 'meaning' is very close to the 'referent' in my previous comment. Crucial thing here is that he is distinguishing 'meaning' and 'bearer'. People in language-games are talking about 'meaning' rather than 'bearers'.
Note that Wittgenstein is using the notion 'langauge' to define the notion 'meaning' as if 'language' is a free concept that does not need to be defined. If a language is defined somewhat as chunks of systematic meaningful sounds or the like, then Wittgenstein's point will fall apart since in the definition of language, the notion 'meaning', which is defined by 'language' in his theory, is employed.
It is not the item itself, but rather the referent that corresponds to a word. Referent is metaphysical and is not going to be obsolete or broken even if the item is physically broken or destroyed. This is true to any langauge-game. And when we are talking about something, we are not really talking about it per se; rather we are talking about the notion, the idea, the sense. Specificity is a li...
2015-07-09 09:59
It is not the item itself, but rather the referent that corresponds to a word. Referent is metaphysical and is not going to be obsolete or broken even if the item is physically broken or destroyed. This is true to any langauge-game. And when we are talking about something, we are not really talking about it per se; rather we are talking about the notion, the idea, the sense. Specificity is a linguistic notion; however specified in actual language, a referent is a referent and is not the actual item. Wittgenstein is, up till now, not noting this very important difference between item and referent.
One may also argue that even if a difference between referent and item is made, such a theory need also explain how the two notions, referent and item, are connected. This might be a problem that falls beyond the realm of linguistic study. Or at least, it is more philosophical than it is linguistic.
I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? ——"So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". ——But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to dis...
2015-06-14 09:04
I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? ——"So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". ——But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you rules ready for such cases—rules saying whether one may use the word "chair" to include this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word "chair"; and are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?
...This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.--And you really get such a queer connexion when a philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems ...
2015-05-25 14:35
...This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.--And you really get such a queer connexion when a philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And here we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism of an object. And we can also say word "this" to the object, as it were address the object as "this"--a queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy... 引自 Part I
...This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.--And you really get such a queer connexion when a philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems ...
2015-05-25 14:35
...This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.--And you really get such a queer connexion when a philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And here we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism of an object. And we can also say word "this" to the object, as it were address the object as "this"--a queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy... 引自 Part I
It is not the item itself, but rather the referent that corresponds to a word. Referent is metaphysical and is not going to be obsolete or broken even if the item is physically broken or destroyed. This is true to any langauge-game. And when we are talking about something, we are not really talking about it per se; rather we are talking about the notion, the idea, the sense. Specificity is a li...
2015-07-09 09:59
It is not the item itself, but rather the referent that corresponds to a word. Referent is metaphysical and is not going to be obsolete or broken even if the item is physically broken or destroyed. This is true to any langauge-game. And when we are talking about something, we are not really talking about it per se; rather we are talking about the notion, the idea, the sense. Specificity is a linguistic notion; however specified in actual language, a referent is a referent and is not the actual item. Wittgenstein is, up till now, not noting this very important difference between item and referent.
One may also argue that even if a difference between referent and item is made, such a theory need also explain how the two notions, referent and item, are connected. This might be a problem that falls beyond the realm of linguistic study. Or at least, it is more philosophical than it is linguistic.
For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. At this time, Wittgenstein is trying to provide a definition to 'meaning'; and his 'meaning' is very close to the 'referent' in my previous comment. Crucial ...
2015-07-09 10:13
For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.引自 43
At this time, Wittgenstein is trying to provide a definition to 'meaning'; and his 'meaning' is very close to the 'referent' in my previous comment. Crucial thing here is that he is distinguishing 'meaning' and 'bearer'. People in language-games are talking about 'meaning' rather than 'bearers'.
Note that Wittgenstein is using the notion 'langauge' to define the notion 'meaning' as if 'language' is a free concept that does not need to be defined. If a language is defined somewhat as chunks of systematic meaningful sounds or the like, then Wittgenstein's point will fall apart since in the definition of language, the notion 'meaning', which is defined by 'language' in his theory, is employed.
I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? ——"So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". ——But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to dis...
2015-06-14 09:04
I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? ——"So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". ——But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you rules ready for such cases—rules saying whether one may use the word "chair" to include this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word "chair"; and are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?
For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. At this time, Wittgenstein is trying to provide a definition to 'meaning'; and his 'meaning' is very close to the 'referent' in my previous comment. Crucial ...
2015-07-09 10:13
For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.引自 43
At this time, Wittgenstein is trying to provide a definition to 'meaning'; and his 'meaning' is very close to the 'referent' in my previous comment. Crucial thing here is that he is distinguishing 'meaning' and 'bearer'. People in language-games are talking about 'meaning' rather than 'bearers'.
Note that Wittgenstein is using the notion 'langauge' to define the notion 'meaning' as if 'language' is a free concept that does not need to be defined. If a language is defined somewhat as chunks of systematic meaningful sounds or the like, then Wittgenstein's point will fall apart since in the definition of language, the notion 'meaning', which is defined by 'language' in his theory, is employed.
It is not the item itself, but rather the referent that corresponds to a word. Referent is metaphysical and is not going to be obsolete or broken even if the item is physically broken or destroyed. This is true to any langauge-game. And when we are talking about something, we are not really talking about it per se; rather we are talking about the notion, the idea, the sense. Specificity is a li...
2015-07-09 09:59
It is not the item itself, but rather the referent that corresponds to a word. Referent is metaphysical and is not going to be obsolete or broken even if the item is physically broken or destroyed. This is true to any langauge-game. And when we are talking about something, we are not really talking about it per se; rather we are talking about the notion, the idea, the sense. Specificity is a linguistic notion; however specified in actual language, a referent is a referent and is not the actual item. Wittgenstein is, up till now, not noting this very important difference between item and referent.
One may also argue that even if a difference between referent and item is made, such a theory need also explain how the two notions, referent and item, are connected. This might be a problem that falls beyond the realm of linguistic study. Or at least, it is more philosophical than it is linguistic.
I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? ——"So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". ——But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to dis...
2015-06-14 09:04
I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? ——"So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion". ——But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you rules ready for such cases—rules saying whether one may use the word "chair" to include this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word "chair"; and are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?
...This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.--And you really get such a queer connexion when a philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems ...
2015-05-25 14:35
...This is connected with the conception of naming as, so to speak, an occult process. Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.--And you really get such a queer connexion when a philosopher tries to bring out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And here we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism of an object. And we can also say word "this" to the object, as it were address the object as "this"--a queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy... 引自 Part I
0 有用 [已注销] 2013-08-08
我觉得中文哲学教科书有一个很糟糕的通病,就是神化哲学家,当然我不否认维维是很帅气。
0 有用 春日來信 2020-05-11
维特根斯坦的epistemic standpoint解释了他的理论很多奇怪的地方...
0 有用 LexLexie 2020-03-19
流水的男朋友,铁打的Wittgenstein
0 有用 Φιλομαθής 2020-04-14
(上了一学期课只知道大佬厉害厉害 没花心思钻进去研究 太惭愧了)
0 有用 路德维希 2010-05-28
了却一桩心事。以后慢慢琢磨。
0 有用 Miao 2021-02-28
A very difficult one for me. I guess I will come back to it after 10 years...
0 有用 凌sappho 2020-06-06
‘Stupidity consists in wanting to reach conclusions. We are a thread, and we want to know the whole cloth ... What mind worthy of the name, beginning with Homer, ever reached a conclusion? Let’s accep... ‘Stupidity consists in wanting to reach conclusions. We are a thread, and we want to know the whole cloth ... What mind worthy of the name, beginning with Homer, ever reached a conclusion? Let’s accept the picture. That’s how things are. So be it ...’ (展开)
0 有用 春日來信 2020-05-11
维特根斯坦的epistemic standpoint解释了他的理论很多奇怪的地方...
0 有用 Φιλομαθής 2020-04-14
(上了一学期课只知道大佬厉害厉害 没花心思钻进去研究 太惭愧了)
0 有用 LexLexie 2020-03-19
流水的男朋友,铁打的Wittgenstein