This first edition of this book was a broad study, drawing on a wide range of published research and historical evidence, of the enormous stock market boom that started around 1982 and picked up incredible speed after 1995. Although it took as its specific starting point this ongoing boom, it placed it in the context of stock market booms generally, and it also made concrete su...
This first edition of this book was a broad study, drawing on a wide range of published research and historical evidence, of the enormous stock market boom that started around 1982 and picked up incredible speed after 1995. Although it took as its specific starting point this ongoing boom, it placed it in the context of stock market booms generally, and it also made concrete suggestions regarding policy changes that should be initiated in response to this and other such booms. The book argued that the boom represents a speculative bubble, not grounded in sensible economic fundamentals. Part one of the book considered structural factors behind the boom. A list of twelve precipitating factors that appear to be its ultimate causes was given. Amplification mechanisms, naturally-occurring Ponzi processes, that enlarge the effects of these precipitating factors, were described. Part Two discussed cultural factors, the effects of the news media, and of "new era" economic thinking. Part Three discussed psychological factors, psychological anchors for the market and herd behavior. Part Four discussed attempts to rationalize exuberance: efficient markets theory and theories that investors are learning. Part Five presented policy options and actions that should be taken. The second edition, 2005, added an analysis of the real estate bubble as similar to the stock market bubble that preceded it, and warned that "Significant further rises in these markets could lead, eventually, to even more significant declines. The bad outcome could be that eventual declines would result in a substantial increase in the rate of personal bankruptcies, which could lead to a secondary string of bankruptcies of financial institutions as well. Another long-run consequence could be a decline in consumer and business confidence, and another, possibly worldwide, recession." Thus, the second edition of this book was among the first to warn of the global financial crisis that began with the subprime mortgage debacle in 2007
Robert J. Shiller is the Stanley B. Resor Professor of Economics at Yale University. He is author of "The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century" (Princeton) and "Market Volatility and Macro Markets", which won the 1996 Paul A. Samuelson Award.
这是入门级的概论课。如果你有一点金融基础，就不必看了。 我记的课堂笔记整理在这里： 1-7课 ， 8-14课 ， 15-23课（完） 我收集的书目： 金融通识 Finance for Liberal Arts Course Description: Financial institutions are a pillar of civilized society, directing resou...
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罗伯特·希勒 作者
张宇涵🔒
中国人民大学出版社2016版
星魂
中国人民大学出版社2008版
食菠萝
時報文化出版社2000版
舍得
中国人民大学出版社2008版
0 有用 凡事利 2020-12-13 21:58:37
毫无新意，都是大路货观点罗列罗列
0 有用 Buqing 2016-10-11 17:09:33
If one tries too hard to be precise, one runs the risk of being so narrow as to be irrelevant.
0 有用 旧居 2009-10-27 22:34:33
数据翔实，分析精湛，这才是真正的做学问，实践学问。
0 有用 目送飞鸿 2017-04-18 21:26:11
1929、1987年黑色星期一市场崩溃当天并没有什么特别的新闻。相反，起作用的是市场下跌本身，价格下跌产生了反馈环（price-to-price feedback）。
0 有用 c.s.e.h. 2011-07-23 18:12:18
一篇不含math & stats的通俗paper
0 有用 cesc 2021-11-04 11:07:54
穷达独善其身，达则兼济天下。最后补充一句，暴打消费主义，存钱才是王道
0 有用 lu 2021-03-27 11:06:32
旧版也翻一下
0 有用 凡事利 2020-12-13 21:58:37
毫无新意，都是大路货观点罗列罗列
0 有用 LTYoung 2018-02-12 06:52:02
后半部分有很多long run short run price movement的讨论 让我想到自己问不同公司trader他们的decision making process 哎 还是exotic/macro比较有意思
0 有用 目送飞鸿 2017-04-18 21:26:11
1929、1987年黑色星期一市场崩溃当天并没有什么特别的新闻。相反，起作用的是市场下跌本身，价格下跌产生了反馈环（price-to-price feedback）。