作者:
J. J. C. Smart
/
Bernard Williams 出版社: Cambridge University Press 副标题: For and Against 出版年: 1973-1-1 页数: 155 定价: USD 30.99 装帧: Paperback ISBN: 9780521098229
Two essays on utilitarianism, written from opposite points of view, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. In the first part of the book Professor Smart advocates a modern and sophisticated version of classical utilitarianism; he tries to formulate a consistent and persuasive elaboration of the doctrine that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined solely by their ...
Two essays on utilitarianism, written from opposite points of view, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. In the first part of the book Professor Smart advocates a modern and sophisticated version of classical utilitarianism; he tries to formulate a consistent and persuasive elaboration of the doctrine that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined solely by their consequences, and in particular their consequences for the sum total of human happiness. This is a revised version of Professor Smart's famous essay 'an outline of a system of utilitarian ethics', first published in 1961 but long unobtainable. In Part II Bernard Williams offers a sustained and vigorous critique of utilitarian assumptions, arguments and ideals. He finds inadequate the theory of action implied by utilitarianism, and he argues that utilitarianism fails to engage at a serious level with the real problems of moral and political philosophy, and fails to make sense of notions such as integrity, or even human happiness itself. Both authors are agreed on utilitarianism's importance: it cuts across a number of different philosophical disputes and combines a systematic account of mata-ethical problems with a distinctive and substantive moral stand. It thus is, or involves, philosophy in both the traditional and the narrower, professional sense of the word, and is a key topic (often the first topic) in introductory philosophy courses. This book should also be of interest to welfare economists, political scientists and decision-theorists.
“the only kind of thing that has intrinsic value is states of affairs, and that anything else that has value has it only because it conduces to some intrinsically value states of affairs” (UFA: 83). (查看原文)
“It is because consequentialism attaches value ultimately to states of affairs, and its concern is with what states of affairs the world contains, that it essentially involves the notion of negative responsibility” (UFA: 95). (查看原文)
行影者
北京大学出版社2018版
哲夫成城
北京大学出版社2018版
0 有用 最近忙于睡觉 2020-03-30 21:38:49
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0 有用 多吃蔬菜 2014-10-13 05:02:17
Outdated philosophy discussion
0 有用 爱未未未来 2008-12-13 23:20:23
文辞华美，逻辑清楚——只可惜这些都不能保证说理的正确
0 有用 当时环佩留清响 2022-01-29 00:33:43
Williams的部分brimming with insights（as always），smart的辩护相比之下就比较uninteresting
0 有用 苦一 2020-05-15 22:07:17
算是读过最经典的部分了，在大学有空读完吧
0 有用 当时环佩留清响 2022-01-29 00:33:43
Williams的部分brimming with insights（as always），smart的辩护相比之下就比较uninteresting
0 有用 爱丽丝的书柜 2021-08-29 23:04:31
@2013-03-31 17:44:33
0 有用 堕落的爱德华 2021-04-01 20:56:07
integrity objection...
0 有用 空竹大师 2021-04-01 09:13:45
斯玛特的论证比较喜欢加了博弈论的那部分，恍然觉得“心理史学”也是阿西莫夫所处的上世纪数学应用在社会科学，哲学试图科学化的一种证明 威廉斯厘清了功利主义的两个特征（重视幸福，重视结果），并由此导致对消极责任的看重。 他在这本书里对功利主义的反驳，举了两个例子（亲手杀一个无辜的人还是放任二十个无辜的人去死），主要是“moral self-indulgence”导致“integrity”在功利主义思路下... 斯玛特的论证比较喜欢加了博弈论的那部分，恍然觉得“心理史学”也是阿西莫夫所处的上世纪数学应用在社会科学，哲学试图科学化的一种证明 威廉斯厘清了功利主义的两个特征（重视幸福，重视结果），并由此导致对消极责任的看重。 他在这本书里对功利主义的反驳，举了两个例子（亲手杀一个无辜的人还是放任二十个无辜的人去死），主要是“moral self-indulgence”导致“integrity”在功利主义思路下无法理解也不被重视。 （忽然觉得这也是PTSD的一种来源。心理学研究可能真比哲学讨论更直观？ (展开)
0 有用 ⠀⠀ 2021-03-13 12:43:14
这个赏心悦目吗。。。威廉斯确实是个明白人