2 called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas - as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precise...
2 called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas - as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modern sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modern times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a naivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate apriori possibilities and necessities.
The possibility of deception is inherent in the evidence of experience and does not annul either its fundamental character or its effect; though becoming evidentially aware of <actual> deception "annuls" the deceptive experience or evidence itself. The evidence of a new experience is what makes the previously uncontested experience undergo that modification of believing called "annulment" or "cancellation"; and it alone can do so. Evidence of experience is therefore always presupposed by the process. The conscious "dispelling" of a deception, with the originality of "now I see that it / is an illusion", is itself a species of evidence, namely evidence of the nullity of something experienced or, correlatively, evidence of the "annulment" of the (previously unmodified) experiential evidence.... (查看原文)
More generally, we must not wonder if our evident truths [nos évidences] are really truths, or if, by some defect of our mind, what is evident for us would actually be revealed as illusory when measured against some truth in itself. For if we speak of illusion, this is because we have previously recognized illusions, and we could only do so in the name of some perception that, at that very moment, vouched for itself as true, such that doubt, or the fear of being mistaken, simultaneously affirms our power of unmasking error and could thus not uproot us from the truth. We are in the truth, and evidentness is “the experience of truth.” To seek the essence of perception is not to declare that perception is presumed to be true, but rather that perception is defined as our access to the truth. (查看原文)
哲夫成城
中国人民大学出版社2012版
东东的Easter
中国人民大学出版社2012版
还没人写过短评呢