作者:
Olson, Mancur 出版社: Harvard University Press 副标题: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Second printing with new preface and appendix 出版年: 1971-1-1 页数: 186 定价: USD 32.50 装帧: Paperback ISBN: 9780674537514
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common i...
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.
Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/[1] or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action...
Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/[1] or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action and contract rights in economic development. Olson focused on the logical basis of interest group membership and participation. The reigning political theories of his day granted groups an almost primordial status. Some appealed to a natural human instinct for herding, others ascribed the formation of groups that are rooted in kinship to the process of modernization. Olson offered a radically different account of the logical basis of organized collective action.
目录
· · · · · ·
Preface, 1971
Introduction
I. A Theory of Groups and Organizations
A. The purpose of organization
B. Public goods and large groups
C. The traditional theory of groups
· · · · · ·
(更多)
Preface, 1971
Introduction
I. A Theory of Groups and Organizations
A. The purpose of organization
B. Public goods and large groups
C. The traditional theory of groups
D. Small groups
E. “Exclusive” and “inclusive” groups
F. A taxonomy of groups
II. Group Size and Group Behavior
A. The coherence and effectiveness of small groups
B. Problems of the traditional theories
C. Social incentives and rational behavior
III. The Labor Union and Economic Freedom
A. Coercion in labor unions
B. Labor-union growth in theory and practice
C. The closed shop and economic freedom in the latent group
D. Government intervention and economic freedom in the latent group
IV. Orthodox Theories of State and Class
A. The economists’ theory of the state
B. The Marxian theory of state and class
C. The logic of the Marxian theory
V. Orthodox Theories of Pressure Groups
A. The philosophical view of pressure groups
B. Institutional economics and the pressure group—John R. Commons
C. Modern theories of pressure groups—Bentley, Truman, Latham
D. The logic of group theory
VI. The “By-Product” and “Special Interest” Theories
A. The “by-product” theory of large pressure groups
B. Labor lobbies
C. Professional lobbies
D. The “special interest” theory and business lobbies
E. Government promotion of political pressure
F. Farm cooperatives and farm lobbies
G. Noneconomic lobbies
H. The “forgotten groups”—those who suffer in silence
Appendix
Index
· · · · · · (收起)
上“行政学经典著作和前沿问题”的博士生课需要阅读大量的文献，并从中学会研究问题的方法，今天课上重点讨论的是David M. Hart的《奥尔森理论的再验证》（Political Representation Among Dominant Firms: Revisiting the "Olsonian Hypothesis"），涉及到对奥尔森集体行动...
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0 有用 空城 2016-09-24 11:36:52
第一章看了好久还是云里雾里，果然还是不适合学经济。。
0 有用 Annieangel 2012-10-14 00:36:35
这本写得真挺好看的。果然喜欢case呢
0 有用 Lincredible#0 2018-09-26 10:52:04
奥尔森是个天才，博论做成这个样子，语言清晰简明逻辑清楚直白，实在厉害。读罢前两章的感觉，就是好像在理论内部的挑错完全进行不了了——他总是用长注堵住人的嘴：我都想到了哇！可是仔细想想，他的理论在这学期课程讨论的抗争政治意义上的集体行动中确实不太适用，大概有以下几个原因:第一，抗争政治群体的边界是更流动的，很难确定某一特定时间节点的总体规模，这样大小群体的区分不是被否定就是被弱化了；第二，抗争政治的结... 奥尔森是个天才，博论做成这个样子，语言清晰简明逻辑清楚直白，实在厉害。读罢前两章的感觉，就是好像在理论内部的挑错完全进行不了了——他总是用长注堵住人的嘴：我都想到了哇！可是仔细想想，他的理论在这学期课程讨论的抗争政治意义上的集体行动中确实不太适用，大概有以下几个原因:第一，抗争政治群体的边界是更流动的，很难确定某一特定时间节点的总体规模，这样大小群体的区分不是被否定就是被弱化了；第二，抗争政治的结果是高度不确定的，和公共品的提供不同，没有人能真正计算出potential benefit来——即使可以，也高度不精确；最后，group size的乘数效应在抗争政治中更加明显：抗争多了一个人本身就带来大量的显性和隐性收益，小团体的抗争除非组织强大、目标明确、对象好找，否则失败的几率更高。 (展开)
0 有用 Steppenwolf 2021-04-05 21:48:08
Apr5.为了帮我弟写作业把拖了好久的这本书给读完了。
0 有用 Kapitan正少年 2013-01-27 13:28:30
Bible for collective action study
0 有用 Cora 2023-03-18 05:01:20 美国
在对的时刻读到了这本对的书。
0 有用 晨逸夔 2021-05-28 09:31:05
Game theory自动减一分
0 有用 Steppenwolf 2021-04-05 21:48:08
Apr5.为了帮我弟写作业把拖了好久的这本书给读完了。
0 有用 少爷光妹 2021-01-17 22:46:47
从实现共同利益的角度来看，经济集团优于非经济集团（我想到婚姻了）。/共同利益不一定产生集体行动（个人利益）。/小集团要比大集团更容易增进共同利益（“搭便车”，“二个和尚抬水喝，三个和尚没水喝”），所以国家才那么提倡集体主义、奉献精神。/1.国家的强制性（税收）2.选择性激励（不服从的个人受到排斥，合作的个人被邀请参加特权小集团）3.减少分利者。
0 有用 姓酱名酱 2020-02-08 12:32:15
集体利益和个人理性的权衡理论，结合我国农村集体化生产历史可以得到更深刻体会。