This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common i...
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.
Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/[1] or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action...
Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/[1] or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action and contract rights in economic development. Olson focused on the logical basis of interest group membership and participation. The reigning political theories of his day granted groups an almost primordial status. Some appealed to a natural human instinct for herding, others ascribed the formation of groups that are rooted in kinship to the process of modernization. Olson offered a radically different account of the logical basis of organized collective action.
目录
· · · · · ·
Preface, 1971
Introduction
I. A Theory of Groups and Organizations
A. The purpose of organization
B. Public goods and large groups
C. The traditional theory of groups
· · · · · ·
(更多)
Preface, 1971
Introduction
I. A Theory of Groups and Organizations
A. The purpose of organization
B. Public goods and large groups
C. The traditional theory of groups
D. Small groups
E. “Exclusive” and “inclusive” groups
F. A taxonomy of groups
II. Group Size and Group Behavior
A. The coherence and effectiveness of small groups
B. Problems of the traditional theories
C. Social incentives and rational behavior
III. The Labor Union and Economic Freedom
A. Coercion in labor unions
B. Labor-union growth in theory and practice
C. The closed shop and economic freedom in the latent group
D. Government intervention and economic freedom in the latent group
IV. Orthodox Theories of State and Class
A. The economists’ theory of the state
B. The Marxian theory of state and class
C. The logic of the Marxian theory
V. Orthodox Theories of Pressure Groups
A. The philosophical view of pressure groups
B. Institutional economics and the pressure group—John R. Commons
C. Modern theories of pressure groups—Bentley, Truman, Latham
D. The logic of group theory
VI. The “By-Product” and “Special Interest” Theories
A. The “by-product” theory of large pressure groups
B. Labor lobbies
C. Professional lobbies
D. The “special interest” theory and business lobbies
E. Government promotion of political pressure
F. Farm cooperatives and farm lobbies
G. Noneconomic lobbies
H. The “forgotten groups”—those who suffer in silence
Appendix
Index
· · · · · · (收起)
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0 有用 Steppenwolf 2021-04-05 21:48:08
Apr5.为了帮我弟写作业把拖了好久的这本书给读完了。
0 有用 叶曳 2013-08-14 19:28:36
不管后人怎么吐槽，奥尔森的理论能抓住社会变迁背后的一些关键机制，能与一些现有理论对话，且也足够简约，这就够了~
0 有用 大清国的猫托邦 2012-06-28 22:51:35
members of large groups have no incentives to take collective action to obtain collective goods @2012-06-28 22:51:35
0 有用 核桃妞 2024-08-09 16:58:41 江苏
日亚买到了二手，读来真是体会到了求知若渴！但我的研究里试图区别于Olson的集团理论，经济学背景也被我直接设置成有限理性。正因为“集团”的相互依存关系，群体成员并非完全理性，而是以复制身边同类的策略为最佳。
0 有用 Evelyn. 2023-03-18 05:01:20 美国
在对的时刻读到了这本对的书。