出版社: Cambridge University Press
副标题: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
出版年: 1990-11-30
页数: 298
定价: USD 29.00
装帧: Paperback
ISBN: 9780521405997
内容简介 · · · · · ·
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to n...
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
作者简介 · · · · · ·
Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the...
Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]
Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]
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Governing the Commons的书评 · · · · · · ( 全部 29 条 )
奥斯特罗姆:第三条道路和治理多元化
这篇书评可能有关键情节透露
作者:周业安 原文网址:http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2009-11-18/154347.html 在经济学领域,通常会流行一些思维定势,其中最典型的莫过于政府和市场两分法。按照标准教科书的说法,一般情况下,市场这只看不见的手在资源配置方面是有效的,但由于现实的社会经济生活中,存在着... (展开)本书核心创新在于“自主、渐进”的制度供给策略
这篇书评可能有关键情节透露
必须要写140字。把总结搬在这里吧 目的 在私有化(企业化)和政府之外,提出了第三种方案,社会性的方案,但又不隔离于政府和市场。政府和市场虽然能解决协调行动获得产出的问题,但都会由少数人攫取所有剩余,不是一种公正的方案;且政府管制存在信息问题和代理人激励问题。 ... (展开)制度供给的失败 | 2020.10-2021.2间的WHU卫生巾互助盒运动评述
《公共事物的治理之道》读书笔记
这篇书评可能有关键情节透露
本书作者是公共选择学派和新制度主义代表人物埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆,通过对不同国家和地区公共池塘资源的使用情况进行研究,作者借助大量的实证数据和制度分析,解释了为什么有些地区会陷入公地悲剧,而有些地区能够实现公共池塘资源的长期存续。在超越利维坦和私有化的基础上,... (展开)埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆的自主治理思想评析
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A preview from Google books | 来自Kat | 2009-02-11 08:43:52 |
这本书的其他版本 · · · · · · ( 全部5 )
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上海译文出版社 (2012)9.1分 411人读过
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上海译文出版社 (2000)8.7分 680人读过
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Cambridge University Press (2015)暂无评分 6人读过
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Cambridge University Press (1990)暂无评分 1人读过
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订阅关于Governing the Commons的评论:
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0 有用 Grasophia 2013-10-07 23:20:18
经典论著
2 有用 功夫熊猫小碗熊 2012-04-15 12:53:26
还要看其它书,只能匆匆一阅。奥女士的思路同前辈名家截然不同:奥尔森、哈丁醉心于提出简洁的、解释力涵盖各种组织和情境的模型,奥女士反对如此过分简化的做法,提倡找出具体情境中影响公用品制度和决策的变量,再以机制加以串联,成为分析框架,用以分析不同的个案积聚成理论;奥尔森、萨缪尔森将公共品和私人物品截然分开,奥女士则指出公用资源在个人攫取机制上形同私人物品,在提供和维持机制上又近似于公共品,两个冲突的机... 还要看其它书,只能匆匆一阅。奥女士的思路同前辈名家截然不同:奥尔森、哈丁醉心于提出简洁的、解释力涵盖各种组织和情境的模型,奥女士反对如此过分简化的做法,提倡找出具体情境中影响公用品制度和决策的变量,再以机制加以串联,成为分析框架,用以分析不同的个案积聚成理论;奥尔森、萨缪尔森将公共品和私人物品截然分开,奥女士则指出公用资源在个人攫取机制上形同私人物品,在提供和维持机制上又近似于公共品,两个冲突的机制在不同的策略互动中碰撞,这一进路解决了奥尔森留下的“选择性激励”到底如何界定的问题;前代理论假定博弈结构的外在限制恒定,国家市场等机制皆有过分简化的定义,故解决方法不是外来权力就是产权安排,奥女士则着重考察小型社区情境中个人如何在互动中设定和改变博弈规则、分配公用资源,提出社区产权的第三条路。 (展开)
0 有用 小屏风 2016-01-27 01:47:31
It begins with scenarios and numbers, and needs a lot of logic, so definitely not for bed reading. I gave up after about ten pages.
0 有用 Katana 2019-05-06 12:18:58
谭老师退休,想起来奥斯特罗姆夫妇,想起来我开政治学系还留存什么遗产,想起来我始终不是学政治科学的料,谭老师及之后Wilson所带给我的那些丝微的兴趣,也许只是斯德哥尔摩。
0 有用 花生米 2019-12-05 18:06:58
诺贝尔奖获得者的著作还是很值得一读,模型概念论述加案例分析详实且有创新,标杆啊
0 有用 何青山 2024-01-25 12:05:10 浙江
The classic reference in public management and public policy.
0 有用 momo 2023-04-06 12:33:34 广东
第一次发现埃莉诺的制度主义分析视角和自己的研究兴趣还挺契合,希望能成为她的徒孙hhh
0 有用 Sapere aude ! 2023-01-11 10:33:33 瑞典
虽然是学术经典,但我总觉得新制度主义的分析路径并不是很能抓住我,相比之下还是更喜欢批判的社会理论。已阅。
0 有用 汉堡增肌又减脂 2022-12-22 23:47:32 浙江
为了综述关于common pool部分补充阅读一些奠基性文献
0 有用 Parker Li 2021-03-05 00:36:47
【COMP】Institution 真的挺好的,就是有点长... 嫌长的(比如我...)可以看Ostrom, Elinor, “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 493-535.