“In perhaps the most remarkable and revealing single sentence of the book, Publius speaks of “this policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, (which ) might be traced through the whole system f human affairs, private as well as public”
the commercial life must be made honorable and universall...
我记下的一些摘录。Martin Diamond的角度非常有趣～P592“In perhaps the most remarkable and revealing single sentence of the book, Publius speaks of “this policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, (which ) might be traced through the whole system f human affairs, private as well as public” the commercial life must be made honorable and universally practiced. “in a republic it is the legislative power that is most to be feared. Only a strong executive can oppose that power and retina the republic excellencies of the regime” 1.the utility of the union2. the insufficiency of the present confederation 3. the necessity of energetic government 4. republicanism of the constitution Montesquieu: only small countries could enjoy republican government. “Publious”federalist paper no.10“a republican remedy for the disease most incident to republican government”a democratic republic. “”publius’ new and true republicanism is therefore a new and true democratic teachingPublius distinguishes a republic from "a pure democracy”. “representative democracy” promises the cure for which we are seeking. It has remained for America to innovate the combination: governments wholly popular and wholly based upon the representative principle. unmixed and extensive republic. “the state governments, for all their improvements, fail utterly to solve the problem of faction which is the problem of popular problem”583, the Federalist. “Publius sees the problems of presentative popular government as threefold. First, there is the possibly that the people will lose control of their government, that the representative rulers will subvert the regime. Second, there is the possibility that popular majorities, through compliant representatives, will rule oppressively. Third, there is the possibility that majorities, through complaint representatives, will rule not oppressively, but foolishly.1. the whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the representative of the people” 2. separation of power. “the executive and the judiciary ust have the means and personal motive to resist the legislature” 3. multiplicity wisdom and virtue. P588“only when there is a distance between the people and their government will there be that difference between the ultimate authority of the people and the immediate authority of their representatives which is the decisive condition supplied by the principle of boy representation and separation of powers. “the majority faction. i.e. the great mass of the little propertied and the unpropertied. “only a certain kind of large republic holds out the prospect of the kind of divisiveness. …the largeness of the large republic offers a remedy for the republican disease only if the large republic is also a modern commercial republic” “the difference according to amount of property, between rich and poor, was the basis of the fatal class struggles of small republics. But Publius sees in the large commercial republic the possibility for the first time of subordinating the difference over amount of property to the difference over kind of property. In such a republic the hitherto fatal class struggle is replaced by the safe, even salutary struggle among different kinds of propertied interests. In such a republic, a man will regard it as more important to himself to further the immediate advantage of his specialized trade, or his specialized calling within a trade, than to advance the general cause of the poor or the rich. The struggle of the various interests veils the difference between the few and the many” ——immediate advantage——the saving multiplicity of faction. In a seminal essay published in the American Political Science Review (1959), “Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers’ Intent,” Diamond challenged the progressive understanding of the founders’ intentions, viz., that the Constitution was a “reactionary” document designed to protect vested minority interests. Using The Federalist as his point of departure, he endeavored to show that the aim of the founders was to provide for deliberative self-government with prudential safeguards against the excesses that had proved fatal to the smaller republics of antiquity. His analysis and conclusions, fleshed out more fully in subsequent articles, have had a lasting impact on contemporary students of the founding period. Diamond, deeply concerned about the growing concentration of powers at the national level, was also a strong proponent of the principle of federalism and administrative decentralization. In ground-breaking essays such as “The Federalist’s View of Federalism” (1961) and “What the Framers Meant by Federalism” (1962), Diamond demonstrated how our modern conception of federalism differs significantly, in both substance and scope, from that held by the framers.